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Abstract 
This thesis emphasizes the negative outcomes associated with misled fear. It begins by 
examining the evolutionary basis of human and animal fear, and then applies the fear learning 
process as well as evolutionarily innate fears to maladaptive cognitive and behavioral outcomes 
that manifest today. One example of such a maladaptive manifestation is a behavior based in 
racial prejudice, occurring from an act based in the evolutionary fear of an out-group. Finally, 
this paper presents how human fear is further misled and manipulated by the media—
intentionally and unintentionally. Overall, the present argument is that humans must increase 
their conscious awareness of how fear processing systems function in order to resist problematic 
behavioral outcomes of misled fear. Particularly for media consumers, this knowledge combined 
with critical media literacy education will be useful in combating fear tactics utilized by the 
media.  
 
 Keywords: Fear, evolutionary psychology, adaptive unconscious, intuition, media  
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Introduction 
 Hiking Papago Mountain in Scottsdale, Arizona I notice a slithering sound I 
automatically assume to be a snake. I immediately freeze and turn to see the tail end sliding 
beneath the prickly bush to my left. I turn back toward the trail and begin a quick jog down the 
path until I realize the snake is nowhere around me and I am safe.  
 Walking through the metro station alone after a long day of work, I am alert to everything 
around me. I am constantly looking over my shoulder to see if anyone is following. Every time I 
glance back, the space is filled with others walking along their way, hardly even recognizing my 
presence. Nonetheless, I continue to check. My body is tense. My mind is racing with thoughts 
of the worst possible scenarios as I practically jog through the halls to the exit. As I reach the 
door to my apartment I immediately breathe a sigh of relief and accept that I am safe.  
Both examples are individual experiences of fear. Fear is adaptive and maladaptive. Fear 
motivates humans to act in ways that benefit them and their survival, but it also contributes to 
behaviors that are not beneficial to an individual’s and society’s  functioning. It is an emotion 
unpleasant to experience and sometimes a catalyst for unwarranted behavior, but still necessary 
to the functioning of human and other animals. This description is contradictory. Fear is both 
beneficial and harmful. Necessary and unnecessary. Determining which depends on the 
circumstances provoking the fear, the situational factors in the current environment, and the 
individual experiencing the emotion.   
Issaac Marks (1987) describes fear as an emotion that has obvious survival value, 
produced in situations where individuals perceive present or impending danger. He calls it a 
normal response to realistic danger—an adaptation critical to survival. A component of Marks’ 
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definition that is necessary to consider is that fear, in general, is the perception of danger. 
Therefore, the emotion of fear can be evoked without threatening stimuli physically being 
present; humans only need to perceive a threat. This discrepancy between the actual experience 
of a threat and the perception of it is the major concern of this paper. While the emotion of fear is 
functional, the process to experience fear is highly subject to error and misperception, and 
therefore, manipulation.  
Throughout this paper, I will grapple with this issue surrounding the human experience of 
fear. While fear may be critical to survival, it is also a contributor to many problematic and 
unnecessary behavioral and emotional reactions in today’s society. I will discuss not only how 
the experience fear is potentially misleading, but how the misperception of danger and 
unwarranted fear causes many problems for human behavior and their culture.  
This paper will answer the question of why humans fear and what survival advantage 
experiencing fear has for humans and other animals. In addition, it will address the question of 
how humans fear, as well as what neurological and physiological processes contribute to the 
experience of fear. I will touch on important ways in which fear is still necessary and often 
valuable—particularly in the form of intuition. Then, I will discuss how misled fear manifests in 
society today in the form of anxiety and fear of the out-group. Finally, to illustrate the 
manipulation of human fear, I will focus on the use of the media and how this communication 
form poses problems for human perceptions of the world around us, and thus perceptions of 
dangerous stimuli. In conclusion, my goal for this thesis is to, first: provide an understanding of 
how (and when) human fear is internally misled or externally manipulated and second, propose a 
	  	   8	  
strategy by which individuals can attempt to oppose the influence these fears have on behavior, 
particularly those behaviors perpetuated by mass media.  
Evolutionary Function of Fear 
Overall, the experience of fear serves a specific survival function for human beings and 
other animals. Arne Ohman (2012) describes the evolutionary purpose of fear as a defense 
response. He says it motivates action that ultimately enhances survival possibilities in dangerous 
situations. For example, freezing is an adaptive response to fear.  It allows living beings to attend 
more closely to environmental stimuli and/or prevent the potential danger from noticing one’s 
presence. Flight, another common response, serves the purpose of avoiding the area of the danger 
altogether. In other situations, aggression or fighting is a defense mechanism used either to 
eliminate the imminent danger or to reintroduce the possibility of flight (Ohman, 2012). These 
basic defense strategies are often used in animals, but by humans as well, to respond to fearful 
stimuli. These three reactions are common, but not the only ways fear manifests in animal and 
human behavior.  
Before examining reactions to fear, it is necessary to discuss what exactly humans and 
other animals fear and how these fears came into existence. Fear presents itself in humans and 
other animals in several ways. First, organisms possess specific innate or predispositions toward 
fear. In his chapter on fear, Melvin Konner (2002) details a study conducted using bird chicks. 
When the shadow with a silhouette shaped like a hawk (a natural predator of the chicks) flew 
over the animals, the chicks reliably retreated into a fearful crouch. But, in response to other 
shaped shadows, no similar responses occurred. This effect occurred in the bird chicks with little 
to no experiential learning opportunities. Therefore, Konner (2002) argues these chicks had no 
	  	   9	  
predisposition to fear other birds passing above them, only the hawk or hawk-like creatures—an 
animal that has evolutionarily posed a threat to this species of bird.  
Similar predispositions to fear evolutionary threats exist in humans as well. One such 
innate fear of humans is to spiders and snakes. Hoehl, Hellmer, Johansson, and Gredeback 
(2017) conducted a study that supported the existence of a human predisposition to fear these 
animals. To do this, they used the reactions of pupil dilations in 6-month-olds to determine the 
state of arousal after experiencing images of spiders and snakes compared to non-threatening 
images. In a first part of this study, participants viewed images of spiders and flowers, or snakes 
and fish. The spider-flower condition produced physiological arousal through pupil dilation 
when participants viewed a spider but not when they viewed a flower. In the snake-fish 
condition, there was little to no difference in the physiological arousal measure between the two 
images.   
 In a second part of this study, participants viewed only snakes or only fish. The results 
displayed a significant increase in dilation for snake condition but not the fish condition. Across 
these two studies, the researchers concluded that pupillary dilation was greater in response to 
snakes and spiders than it was in response to fish and flowers. Infants at 6-months were able to 
recognize ancestral threats and fear responses occurred accordingly. In conclusion, Hoehl et al. 
(2017) provide evidence for the existence of a predisposition to fear historically threatening 
animals such as spiders and snakes.  
 Another example of a seemingly innate or predisposed fear of humans is the fear of holes 
or tessellated patterns. In its extreme condition, this fear is known as trypophobia. Cole and 
Wilkins (2013) conducted a study that involved exposing participants to visual images that tend 
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to induce unpleasant sensations in those with trypophobia. The images consisted of a variety of 
styles, but all including clusters of holes. Such images associated with skin lesions were avoided. 
Cole and Wilkins (2013) found that these images elicited fear responses to those with the phobia, 
but a general discomfort in most participants. In a secondary analysis, Cole and Wilkins (2013) 
found that such tessellated patterns (or clusters of holes) are found on a multitude of animals that 
are highly poisonous and thus, dangerous to humans. Fear of holes may be an adaptation to avoid 
these animals. 
Human and other animal predispositions to fear allow individuals to be aware of and thus 
avoid dangerous stimuli without having to experience a threat from them first-hand. This 
awareness and fear of potential dangers decreases the chances that organisms will be harmed by 
the subjects of these fears. Fear-induced aversions to snakes, spiders, and other poisonous 
animals that can be identified through tessellated skin patterns potentially serves a protective 
function for humans. Additionally, the predisposition to fear certain stimuli reduces the amount 
of fear learning that needs to occur in each new generation and thus increases the likelihood of 
survival. In other words, the fact that humans tend to fear clusters of holes, for example, 
promotes the avoidance of such dangers without having to be harmed or see another individual 
incur harm.  
Thus, innate fears of humans and other animals have direct benefits. In addition, certain 
biases possessed especially by humans can be beneficial as well. One such bias is an attentional 
bias toward danger. A study conducted by LoBue and DeLoache (2008) describes the human 
tendency toward recognizing fear-invoking stimuli faster than non-threatening stimuli. Humans 
can attend to and perceive threatening or fear-relevant stimuli quicker and more efficiently than 
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when searching for or perceiving non-threatening stimuli. This ability also provides a survival 
advantage. The quicker humans recognize the poisonous insect in the room, the quicker they can 
react to it, and the greater the chances of survival. In sum, humans and other animals benefit 
immensely from evolutionary adaptations surrounding the emotion of fear. Evolution has 
enhanced living beings’ ability to recognize and react to fear, thus increasing the ability to 
survive. 
The experience of fear is vital to sustaining the well-being of humans. Initially, fear 
introduces a state of arousal in the presence of a potential danger. This emotionally induced state 
of alertness contributes to the internal decision-making process regarding how to best respond to 
the potential threat to increase the likelihood of survival. As Diebec and LeDoux (2004) explain, 
fear is the feeling that results when the defense system is active in a brain that has the capacity 
for self-awareness. They call fear the “danger-detection system.” With this system, humans have 
the ability to engage in introspection regarding the emotions experienced and act accordingly. 
Humans can disregard or accept the emotional experience of fear. Thus, humans can decide 
when and how to react they react to fear. This concept is the foundation for later arguments in 
this paper.  
The emotion of fear arises in several different ways in humans and other animals. 
Animals commonly exhibit innate fears to evolutionarily primed predators and humans to 
animals or situations that have evolutionarily threatened well-being. But, since fear is adaptive 
and contributes to the ability to survive, living beings must also be able to experience fear 
towards things/events they are not predisposed to fear. For that reason, learned fears are another 
way humans and other species are able to experience and react to dangerous stimuli.  
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When viewing a threatening stimulus, anticipating a dangerous situation, or remembering 
an aversive event, blood pressure increases, muscles tense, and the release of stress hormones 
occurs. This is the physiological experience of fear according to Debiec and LeDoux (2004). The 
emotional experience is subjective, but the physiological responses are similar in all humans and 
many vertebrates (Konner, 2002). Humans perceive these bodily changes. Whether it is sweaty 
palms or elevated heart rate, humans recognize the presence of the emotion sometimes based on 
their body’s response to an event or stimulus (Ohman, 2012). It is then through fear conditioning, 
a form of classical conditioning, that humans learn to associate these events or stimuli with the 
emotion of fear, and come to view them as potential threats.   
Robert Sapolsky (2017) describes the classical conditioning process in rats. Expose the 
rats to an electric shock (a fear-related stimulus) and a tone simultaneously. Eventually, the 
sound of the tone alone will provoke a fear reaction from the rats because they learn to expect the 
electric shock to follow. This is a common example of how fear is artificially produced in 
animals. Genuine fear conditioning occurs when humans and other animals learn to associate 
dangerous stimuli with these fear reactions. The primary concern of this paper will be classically 
conditioned fear responses—the response that occurs when no threat is truly present.  
In rats and other animals, including humans, fear can be manufactured (or conditioned) 
by pairing a neutral event with an aversive event. Eventually that animal learns to associate the 
neutral event with the aversive one, creating a reliable fear response to the neutral event. This 
neutral stimulus (like the tone in the rat example) alone would cause no harm to the human or 
animal (Debiec & LeDoux, 2004). In other words, humans and other animals can learn to express 
responses to signals of danger when no danger yet exists; they react to indicators that danger or a 
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threat is soon to occur or appear. According to Debiec and LeDoux (2004), the classical fear 
conditioning process occurs quickly, often after only one pairing of the two stimuli. Additionally, 
this conditioning is difficult to extinguish and the memory of the stimuli often remains long-
term. One way to weaken or extinguish the fear conditioning response is to create situations in 
which the neutral stimulus alone is not followed by the aversive stimulus, thus showing that no 
threat actually follows the neutral stimulus. This process, if repeated, works to slowly diminish 
the fear association, but it is never completely unlearned. This is evident by the fact that if 
conditioning has previously occurred and then extinguished, the same association is even easier 
to re-condition at a later time. Overall, fear learning is easily induced and difficult to remove. It 
is to human and other animal’s evolutionary benefit if the things that are dangerous are easily 
learned and remembered throughout its lifetime (Debiec & LeDoux, 2004).  
 Ohman (2012) reiterates the genuine fear conditioning process in humans, specifically. 
Humans associate two stimuli, one that is neutral, such as the sound of a predator, and one that is 
dangerous, such as the predator itself, to produce an action that ultimately should result in 
protecting the individual from harm. This example of fear conditioning is a productive adaptation 
that increases the likelihood of survival for humans and other animals. It is beneficial to associate 
the sound of a predator with danger. In most cases, it is not beneficial to associate an auditory 
tone with danger, such as in the rat example.  
For this reason, it is important to note that the difficulty of the fear learning process 
changes depending on the stimulus one is learning to fear. Martin Seligman (2016) discusses a 
survival adaptation involving fear that he calls evolved preparedness. He defines preparedness as 
how much input must occur before an expected output reliably occurs. In other words, a more 
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easily obtained output exhibits more preparedness. This relates to fear conditioning in the sense 
that humans and animals are highly prepared to fear particular stimuli and also to learn to fear 
certain stimuli more easily than others. Sapolsky (2017) gives the example of snakes versus 
flowers from a study conducted by Cook and Mineka (1990). In this study, laboratory monkeys 
that had no previous exposure to either stimulus, learning to fear snakes was easier than learning 
to fear artificial flowers (Cook & Mineka, 1990). This study is further evidence of the existence 
of predisposed fears, but also the existence of an evolved preparedness in learning what to fear.  
In addition to predisposed fears and this evolved preparedness to fear particular stimuli, 
humans and other animals have the ability to view the dangerous encounters of others and learn 
to fear particular stimuli observationally (Ohman, 2012). This allows living beings the 
evolutionary benefit of not having to experience many dangers first hand. Humans and other 
animals can learn what stimuli/situations to avoid based on the knowledge of experiences of 
others. In summation, the three ways in which humans experience fears are as predisposed fears, 
through classical fear conditioning or direct fear learning, and through observational fear 
learning.   
In animals and human, each of the three types of fear conditioning have undergone long 
evolutionary processes that produce fixed action patterns in the face of particular stimuli 
(Konner, 2002). Konner will admit though, “fixed” implies a permanence to the evolutionary 
fear-stimuli associations, but this is not the case. Fear learning in humans and other animals is 
easy to accomplish and difficult to extinguish, but extinguishing learned fears is entirely 
possible. This capability is essential to recognize, especially when fear conditioning occurs 
toward non-threatening stimuli, or when evolutionary-based fears are no longer serving an 
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adaptive function in an individual’s current living environment. Before addressing this further, it 
is necessary to identify the brain systems that produce fear and its reactions in order to better 
understand the emotion of fear at its basic, functional level.  
Fear in the Brain 
 The brain mechanism central to the experience of fear is the amygdala. The amygdala 
processes sensory information in two ways—the low route and the high route (Ohman, 2012). 
The low route is the quicker, more crude method of processing information. The information 
from a stimulus is sent directly from the thalamus through the amygdala, which has rudimentary 
visual processing capabilities. The amygdala then sends the information to brain systems that 
induce emotional or behavioral output. Potential responses include defense reflexes, activation of 
the autonomic nervous system, and the release of stress hormones, among other things (Ohman, 
2012). In contrast, the high route is the slower, more detailed processing method. It involves the 
brain systems used by the low route as well as the prefrontal cortex and primary sensory cortices 
to more fully process information. These brain mechanisms evaluate the information before 
sending it through the amygdala which then transmits it to the systems that induce emotional or 
behavioral output (Ohman, 2012).  
Similar to Ohman (2012), Kahneman (2011) labels the automatic, involuntary processing 
method System 1, while the effortful system that makes sense of System 1 information, System 
2. Kahneman calls System 1 impulsive and impressionable, whereas System 2 is deliberate and 
action-oriented. While called by different names, these two processing systems, both provide an 
evolutionary advantage for humans in experiencing and responding to fear-inducing stimuli. 
They allow for quick and usually accurate evaluations of stimuli and assist in promoting a 
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necessary behavioral response. This processing of external environments is necessary for humans 
and other animals to avoid and react in unsafe situations. Particularly through unconscious 
processing, individuals can quickly react to dangerous stimuli for the purposes of protection. 
Without this mechanism, the physical well-being of living beings would be at much greater risk. 
These two processing systems interact to operate in a fast, but accurate way—at least much of 
the time.  
 Guiding these two information processing systems are two fundamental emotion systems 
known as the behavioral inhibition system and the behavioral activation system. Jeffery Gray 
(1991) defines behavioral inhibition system outputs as consisting of inhibition of ongoing 
behavior, increased level of arousal, and increased attention to environmental stimuli. This is the 
system necessary to our experiences of and reactions to fear. Through the behavioral inhibition 
system, fear occurs when a stimulus causes increased arousal or environmental attention 
signaling a threat. Then, the behavioral activation system produces behaviors that focus on 
relieving unpleasant emotions, such as fear, which often includes inducing an action that 
addresses the source of the fear (Gray, 1991). The behavioral inhibition system utilizes the 
hippocampus to incline a person to cease prior activities, increase attention towards potentially 
dangerous environmental stimuli, and prepare for further action that will be initiated by the 
amygdala (Konner, 2012). It is then the amygdala that induces automatic fear responses through 
the high or low route depending on the urgency of the situation and whether or not the high 
route/System 2 intervenes.  
 The hippocampus and the amygdala function alongside the behavioral inhibition and 
activation systems to produce the emotion of fear and its responses. Debiec & LeDoux (2004) 
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provides an explanation that says the amygdala produces the emotion itself and contributes to the 
action that results. Meanwhile, the hippocampus assists in learning the association between the 
stimuli and induced emotion (Konner, 2002). Essentially, the hippocampus provides the context, 
while the amygdala produces the fear. For example, a rat that has learned to associate a neutral 
tone with an electric shock will fear the electric shock due to the amygdala, but will associate the 
tone with the electric shock due to the hippocampus. The central gray region of the midbrain 
controls the actions associated with fear as prompted by the amygdala. From this region, the 
hypothalamus can prevents the midbrain from immediately acting on experiences of fear (i.e. 
high route intervention); however, the amygdala sometimes bypasses these intervention efforts to 
induce immediate action when fear reactions are deemed necessary (i.e. low route processing) 
(Konner, 2002).  
To further highlight the role of the amygdala and the hippocampus in producing fear, one 
study looked at individuals with amygdala and/or hippocampal damage and the effects these had 
on fear and fear responses. Bechara, Tranel, Damasio, Adolphs, Rockland, and Damasio (1995) 
found that those with damage to the amygdala could not successfully undergo fear conditioning 
or develop a fear conditioned response. Thus, fear could not be experienced as a learned 
response. Participants with amygdala damage could understand that they should fear a particular 
stimulus because of its constant occurrence with an aversive event, but they still could not elicit 
an automatic fear response to the neutral stimulus alone. In those with only hippocampal 
damage, conditioning occurred and fear responses resulted from a new stimulus when presented 
in succession. However, the participants could not understand the association between the 
pairing of the neutral and aversive stimuli. In other words, the fear conditioning was successful 
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and fear responses occurred, but the participants were unable to learn the new “cause” associated 
with the fear they were experiencing (Bechara et al., 1995). This study identifies the necessity of 
both the hippocampus and the amygdala in learning to fear and acting on the experience of it.  
Fear is rooted in the evolutionary nature of human beings. Humans and other animals are 
predisposed to fear ancestral dangers, prepared to learn to fear particular threats more easily than 
others, and are capable of observationally associating fear with stimuli that have posed dangers 
to other living beings. Fear is functional. It predicts dangers and allows living things to act before 
a survival threat occurs. With the emotion of fear comes the possibility of avoiding threats, and 
thus surviving them (Ohman, 2012). This section has outlined not only why fear is adaptive and 
necessary for human and other animal survival, but how they learn, process, and react to the 
emotion. The next section will use this knowledge of how fear operates and apply it solely to 
human behavior in society today. It will discuss how fear is still adaptive in addressing present 
dangers, but also how the human processing of fear can produce maladaptive outcomes as well.  
Integration of Social Psychology and Evolutionary Fear 
Fear as Adaptive 
Gavin DeBecker (1997) addresses the human evolutionarily adaptive emotion of fear in 
his book, The Gift of Fear. He argues that fear is central to human safety even today. DeBecker 
associates evolutionarily predisposed/learned fears with human intuition and reiterates its life-
saving capacity. Intuition is the innate ability to sense imminent or impending danger. The Gift of 
Fear identifies the emotion of fear as a major contributor to the intuitive senses of humans and 
suggests it serves the ultimate purpose of promoting survival by sending signals that force 
humans to react without requiring logical, conscious thought. DeBecker states that even though 
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humans experience fear and have these intuitive abilities, humans often ignore or deny them. 
While fear theoretically should motivate individuals to act in a way that is beneficial for survival, 
humans for some reason, often discount and question their intuition. DeBecker’s central 
argument focuses on the harm questioning or ignoring intuition poses for humans. He details 
many consequences of ignoring intuition and provides case studies and hypothetical examples 
for how this does/could impact an individual’s safety and ultimately their survival (DeBecker, 
1997).  
One example provided by DeBecker was of a woman he calls Nancy. Nancy sat in the 
passenger seat of a vehicle while her friend made a quick trip to the ATM. Seemingly out of 
nowhere, Nancy was overcome with fear and distress as she scrambled to exit the car. This 
emotional fear response was accurate, but her behavioral response was not quick enough as a 
man entered the driver’s side of the car, kidnapping Nancy. The emotion of fear prompted her 
further to survive the encounter with this dangerous man. In her heightened emotional state, she 
ultimately engaged the man in conversation in order to distract him. DeBecker details her 
recurring thought as being, this man could not kill someone he respects and knows well. With 
this in mind, she conversed with him as if they were good acquaintances until he ultimately 
released her. Nancy’s original fear seemed to come from nothing. DeBecker argued that this was 
not the case. Rather, on reflection, Nancy remembered seeing a blue flash in the passenger 
mirror. It was the man’s blue jeans. What she inherently knew (without actually knowing) was 
that this man was too close to her car and moving too quickly to be an innocent pedestrian 
(DeBecker, 1997, p.76). Nancy’s fear in this case motivated logical actions that ultimately saved 
her life.  
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Fear, as a contributor to human intuition, conveys information about possible imminent 
risk before full comprehension of the situation occurs. DeBecker (1997) calls this ability 
knowing without knowing why. He argues that humans do not have to know why the emotion of 
fear arises to act in a way that benefits them. Humans only need to recognize the fear in order to 
act in life-saving ways. He insists that questioning the emotional experiences of fear, then 
doubting or denying that the source of it was valid, is detrimental to survival. Evolutionarily, fear 
exists to motivate action and provide a survival advantage for humans, often outside of conscious 
awareness. When humans consistently override those adaptive processes with conscious thought 
and questioning, they put themselves at greater risk in many situations. Overall, DeBecker argues 
that intuition signals are always in response to something and that it is to an individual’s 
detriment to ignore that something or try to explain it away (DeBecker, 1997). After all, it is 
better to have addressed intuitive senses of discomfort or fear and no threat be present, than to 
have ignored those emotions and have a dangerous situation occur.  
This concept that it is better to over-perceive threats than under-perceive them is 
generally known as error management theory in evolutionary psychology (Park, 2012). This 
theory states that humans have evolved predispositions to over-detect potentially harmful stimuli, 
as this is more beneficial to one’s survival than to under-detect and have a greater chance of not 
recognizing a stimulus that is life-threatening. In discussion of this theory, Justin Park (2012) 
argues that it is costlier to miss a potential threat than it is to perceive a threat as present when it 
actually is not. Essentially, this theory identifies a human bias toward erroneous conclusion of 
false alarms. Humans are evolutionarily adapted to perceive threats when none are present so that 
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they do not miss threats when they are. The implications of this bias will be relevant, again, later 
in this paper.  
Gavin DeBecker (1997) provides important insight into how human evolutionarily 
adaptive fear mechanisms manifest and are productive in modern settings. Similar to DeBecker’s 
idea of fear as a contributor to human intuition is Timothy Wilson’s idea of the adaptive 
unconscious. In his book Strangers to Ourselves, Wilson (2002) describes the interaction 
between the human conscious and unconscious. Wilson defines the unconscious as the automatic 
processing of information about human beings, themselves, and their experiences. Then, from 
prior knowledge, the unconscious identifies information and sorts it into categories in order to 
make better sense of it—an evolutionary process designed to be advantageous. The ability to 
gather large amounts of stimuli, makes sense of this information, and respond to particular 
portions that require immediate action without the effort of conscious, cognitive processing has 
proven beneficial for living beings. Wilson calls this processing ability the adaptive unconscious. 
This is the main processing method of human fear. Individuals recognize a specific threat when 
evaluating their environments and the emotion of fear unconsciously results. DeBecker (1997) 
argues that, because it is adaptive, intuition at least deserves the immediate attention of humans. 
Wilson (2002), however, argues that although this process is adaptive, it is prone to error and 
usually requires intervention from the human conscious.  
Responses that occur as a result of the adaptive unconscious, are often quick and 
uncontrollable—such as fear responses. Again, these effortless responses are often necessary for 
functioning, and occasionally for survival. Human consciousness, an alternative processing 
mechanism used by some living beings, operates within an individual’s awareness and is the 
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fact-checker for unconscious processing (Wilson, 2002). The conscious is a slower, but more 
detailed analysis of information. Conscious processing is controllable and intentional. This 
conscious processing is what DeBecker (1997) refers to when discussing how humans intervene 
to question/doubt their intuition.  
Conscious versus unconscious processing, as described by Wilson, are similar to the low 
and high routes for processing fear, or Kahneman’s System 1 and System 2 processing. 
Kahneman (2011) argues, similar to Wilson, that System 1 is constantly running while System 2 
sits back engaging little effort until its services are needed. Kahneman points out that System 2 
generally adopts the evaluation of System 1, unless System 1 processing cannot achieve a 
sufficient conclusion (Kahneman, 2011).  
So, the adaptive unconscious (i.e. System 1) and conscious processing (i.e. System 2) 
both interact and contribute to the experience of fear and human reactions to it. Wilson (2002) 
states that the adaptive unconscious operates intelligently outside awareness, but humans have 
ultimate control over what information this system uses to make judgments. Therefore, humans 
have control over the behavior those judgments create. Wilson advocates for the intervention of 
the conscious into the adaptive unconscious. He bases this argument on the fact that the speed of 
the adaptive unconscious subjects it to inaccuracy. In other words, while this process is adaptive 
and often provides valuable insights and advantages for humans, there exists a conflict between 
speed and accuracy in evaluating large amounts of information.  
But, DeBecker (1997) seems to argue that the human adaptive unconscious, or intuition, 
does not function as strongly as the conscious check system, or the human denial process, as he 
calls it. DeBecker argues that unless humans can explain intuition logically, they tend to 
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disregard it. In other words, it is a disadvantage that human consciousness often overpowers 
unconscious processing when experiencing fear.  
This paper accepts both these stances to an extent. Yes, it is valuable to recognize human 
intuitive abilities and attend to those. And yes, it is sometimes valuable to act immediately in 
response to a fearful stimulus. But, many times it is not. Consciousness is often needed to 
evaluate the source of fear and ensure that its truly threatening. In addition, conscious processing 
is necessary to control the human bias detailed by error management theory (Park, 2012). This 
paper recognizes the value of both DeBecker and Wilson’s arguments, but tends to view the 
adaptive unconscious as Jonathon Haidt (2006) does using his elephant and rider analogy. 
Haidt’s idea is that the elephant is the human adaptive unconscious and the rider is human 
consciousness. While the rider is seemingly in control of the elephant, any disagreement between 
the wishes of the two would result in an elephant victory. The elephant has the size to overpower 
the rider and their wishes. Similarly, I would argue, as Haidt does, that human consciousness, 
while usually in control, can be overpowered by the adaptive unconscious or System 1 
processing.  
When the human conscious and unconscious conflict, the results can be adaptive or 
maladaptive. Using the elephant and rider metaphor, if the rider is casually riding along and the 
elephant decides to change direction because it perceives a blockage in the current path ahead, 
that is an adaptive response that probably benefits the rider. However, if the elephant perceives a 
blockage in the path ahead and will not continue the journey at all, this is not beneficial for the 
rider and their wishes have conflicted to produce an undesirable outcome.  
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Historically, human adaptive unconscious and consciousness have interacted in a way 
that is useful. Now, however, in novel environments, human biases toward the over-perceptions 
of threats (Park, 2012) and other facets of the adaptive unconscious that were once entirely 
adaptive, are now posing problems for humans in the form of misled fear (Wilson, 2002). While 
conscious processing is also subject to inaccuracy, the error of the adaptive unconscious will be 
the focus of this paper, as fear responses that occur outside of conscious awareness are arguably 
the most dangerous and difficult to recognize and avoid. While the adaptive unconscious is an 
evolutionary adaptation, when currently processing stimuli that evoke fear, it can have extremely 
problematic cognitive and behavioral outcomes in society today.  
Fear as Maladaptive 
Fearing something is evidence that a threat is not happening yet. This is one feature of 
intuition or the adaptive unconscious. Humans use consciousness to evaluate whether their initial 
intuition was correct and danger is present, or that intuition was misled and no danger exists. But, 
within this process, false conclusions can occur. First, humans can decide that intuition was 
correct, when there actually is no danger present, and act in accordance with the fear 
experienced. Additionally, humans can decide that intuition was wrong and not act, even though 
danger does actually exist.  
Gavin DeBecker (1997) addresses both possibilities. He warns against falling prey to the 
latter. Park’s (2012) error management theory supports this belief. DeBecker argues it is better to 
react to fear in a way that promotes survival when unnecessary, than to override feelings of fear 
and a danger actually be present. While the intuition process is effective and often accurate, the 
conscious denial process can counteract it. This can sometimes pose a serious threat to human 
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survival if consistently ignoring or trying to explain away experiences of fear—an emotion 
adapted to promote safety. My argument, however, is that reacting to fear on intuition alone is 
often even costlier.  
Human bias toward a greater amount of “false alarms” does exist for an evolutionary 
reason, but so does human consciousness. Fear and its automatic responses can be maladaptive 
for the individuals themselves and those around them. While accepting that fear is adaptive and 
can produce adaptive outcomes, I am arguing that, as fear responses manifest today, they are 
commonly maladaptive. Even DeBecker (1997), a proponent of fear as a gift that enhances 
human survival, warns against the dangers of acting upon the experience of fear when no danger 
exists (i.e. reacting to misled fear).  
DeBecker (1997) argues that unwarranted fear controls humans more than it does any 
other creature or more than any other emotion in existence. He comments on the existence of 
unwarranted fear in society and how this type of fear detracts from human adaptive abilities. 
DeBecker concludes that what humans fear is rarely what they think they fear—it is what they 
link to the experience of fear. In saying this, he does not conclude that humans are unable to 
identify the true source/cause of experiences of fear, rather that there is a tendency to falsely 
interpret other emotional experiences as fear and react accordingly. Thus, mis-linked (or mis-
identified) fear has the capacity to invoke adverse emotional and behavioral responses.  
Fear, DeBecker (1997) states, is the greatest indicator of urgency. If experiencing fear, 
the emotion should be attended to. But, other emotional experiences exist that are less urgent and 
thus, less immediately necessary to attend to for survival purposes. For example, apprehension, 
worry, suspicion, and doubt should not evoke the same amount of attention or immediacy of 
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reaction as fear, yet sometimes they do. DeBecker reports that reactions/feelings of panic and 
worry often result from mis-identified or misled fear. He calls panic the enemy of survival. When 
panic or worry occur, it is not functional or productive. Both interrupt clear thinking and detract 
from objective experiences of fear, and thus the human ability to react to them. It is possible that 
these are the result of mistaken experiences of fear. I maintain the stance, that this “mistaken 
fear” can occur in one of two ways. First, when a situation or experience is currently not 
threatening enough to provoke fear it instead evokes a similar emotion that does not necessitate 
an immediate response, but still produces an aroused state similar to fear (e.g. anxiety). Second, 
when human intuition is interpreted incorrectly, or when humans think they have identified the 
source of their fearful state when in reality their conclusion (many times, an unconscious 
conclusion) is wrong.  
The idea of productive versus non-productive fear is essential to this argument. The 
evolutionary basis for fear promotes its productivity when encountering evolutionary based 
threats. For example, the low route/System 1 perceives a cliff edge, so the human reaction is to 
move several steps in the opposite direction. After high route/System 2 processing, that person 
concludes that it is not a cliff face, rather a small ditch that can be crossed safely. This mis-
perception has minor consequences. In this and in similar evolutionary based examples, a false 
alarm is not that costly. But, it is in novel environments in which fear and fear reactions become 
not only non-productive, but maladaptive.  
I am defining non-productive fears as those in which fear is mistaken or misled (i.e. when 
an aroused state occurs similar to fear, but no immediate action is required to increase safety). 
This aroused state, arguably, mistaken to be fear, produces an emotion that is often times unable 
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to be logically explained using conscious processing or System 2/high route. In other words, 
human recognize an emotion that is similar to fear (anxiety, worry, etc.) but either cannot 
identify its true source or do not know how to effectively address the source of the emotion 
through conscious processing. Because of this, these emotions are non-productive, commonly 
induced within novel environments, and usually do not result well, even from interactions with 
conscious processing, the high route, or System 2.  
Non-productive fears are often associated with the terms anxiety, panic, and worry. 
Jeffery Gray (1991) argues that when one experiences anxiety, this anxiety has subsumed the 
fear that would have been felt if the environment required an immediate reaction. In other words, 
when humans attend to stimuli perceived as threatening and are unsure of how to proceed 
behaviorally, the emotion of fear becomes anxiety because productive action is no longer 
motivated to resolve the unpleasant emotion. Ohman (2012) supports this by explaining that in 
situations of helplessness, in which the emotion of fear cannot motivate any action that will 
alleviate the imminent threat, anxiety is the resulting experience. Konner states that anxiety is 
then a “future-oriented emotion” (Konner, 2002, p. 227). He suggests its purpose may be to 
alarm humans of potential future danger that their current actions or behaviors are setting them 
up for. So, Konner (2002) argues that anxiety is essentially a form of fear that is intended to 
motivate a change in current behavior for future returns. Still though, in its initial state, misled 
fear in the form of anxiety decreases the intended functionality and adaptive nature of fear.  
Anxiety and related-emotions to do provoke behavioral changes similar to the emotion of 
fear. But, the novel stimuli with which anxiety usually responds to has no evolutionary basis, and 
thus responses are not engrained to be productive, survival-enhancing actions. While cognitive 
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and behavioral responses to experiences of anxiety can be beneficial, they can also not be. 
Anxiety many times promotes cognitions that adversely impact human beings, catalyze misled 
fear responses that are generally non-productive at diminishing the source of the unpleasant 
emotion, and thus, overall, provide little to no benefit for individuals.  
To better understand the dangers of misled fear (in the form of anxiety/related-emotions 
and mis-identified fear), it is necessary to understand how fear influences behavior in a general 
way that relates to novel environments. Evolutionarily humans and other animals are primed to 
react to threatening stimuli in a way that promotes survival. But, what about when a threat is not 
imminent, but rather a socially-oriented fear? DeWall, Baumeister, Chester, and Bushman (2016) 
conducted a study to better understand how emotion predicts behavior and judgment today.  
DeWall et al. (2016) considered two theoretical perspectives when approaching this 
study. The first is the well-known and accepted idea known as emotion-as-a-direct-causation 
perspective. This perspective is defined as current emotions guiding immediate behavior and 
judgment. An example of emotion-as-a-direct-causation is when an individual sees an animal 
that is potentially dangerous and flees the situation to avoid it. In this case, the emotion of fear 
was directly experienced and it caused the action of fleeing. The second perspective is called 
emotion-as-feedback. This perspective is defined as when anticipated emotions guide future 
behavior and judgment. In other words, the emotions humans perceive as having the potential to 
occur, drive future, and sometimes immediate actions. For example, an individual who knows 
fear follows from experiencing heights may avoid any situation involving heights in order to 
avoid the experience of fear. In this case, the fear of heights was not directly experienced but the 
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potential for the emotion was enough to motivate avoidance behavior. This example of this 
perspective could also be seen as the fear of a future fear motivating behavior.  
In both cases, emotions (fear, in particular) play a role in initiating the behaviors that 
follow. But, in the research reviewed by DeWall et al. (2016), emotion-as-feedback produced 
significantly more reliable predictions of behavior than the emotion-as-direct-causation 
perspective. This study differentiates between productive and non-productive fear responses and 
potentially explains why non-productive responses are becoming more prevalent. While 
evolutionary-based fears, or productive fear responses, are still necessary and prevalent in novel 
environments, DeWall et al.’s (2016) study seems to suggest that fear directly causing behavior 
in a singular instance is less common than perhaps continuous behavioral changes in response to 
anticipated emotions. This correlates with the fact that many fears in current environments do not 
have evolutionary bases or reactions known to promote survival. For this reason, humans are 
relying more on anticipated emotions, such as fear of a fear, to avoid certain experiences that 
have the potential to impact physical, mental, and/or social well-being.  
The increasing reliance on anticipated emotion is a catalyst for fear manifesting 
maladaptively. This paper will return to the idea of misled fear in the form of anxiety and 
related-emotions, but first, it will discuss how misled fear in the form of mis-attributions to the 
sources/causes of fear have negative impacts on society and how this combined with anticipatory 
emotions produces problematic cognitive and behavioral outcomes. DeWall et al. (2016) also 
introduced the idea of fear of backlash—an anticipated fear that guides people to conform to and 
behave according to stereotypes and social norms. Stereotypes and social norms have adaptive 
functions for human beings that provide the ability to process large amounts of information 
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quickly, also using unconscious processing. But, when there is no conscious or System 2 
intervention and the stereotypes and social norms are false and/or a misrepresentation of a person 
or group of people, this tendency and its outcomes are maladaptive. This next section will 
provide specific examples of how misled fears, even ones that have evolutionary bases, can 
manifest maladaptively in modern society.  
Fear of the Out-group. Misled fear, promoted by a wrong conclusion from System 1 (or 
low route) processing, presents non-productive and even problematic behaviors in current human 
society. A study by Olsson, Ebert, Banaji, and Phelps (2005) further explained how misled fear 
with a basis in an evolutionary fear of the out-group, negatively manifests in social settings. The 
researchers studied how fear conditioning and race bias may rely on overlapping neural systems, 
which results in misled fear and problematic reactions to such experiences of fear. Olsson et al. 
(2005) detail classical fear conditioning and how individuals from other racial groups are more 
readily associated with aversive stimuli. In other words, humans have the tendency to more 
easily learn to fear members of an out-group. 
In this study, Olsson et al. (2005) implemented fear extinguishing techniques in 
participants. Fear toward members of an in-group was able to be extinguished, while out-group 
fears often were not. More specifically, Black individuals’ conditioned fear responses to White 
faces could not be readily extinguished and the same result occurred when White individuals 
viewed Black faces. This study concludes that humans are more likely to associate aversive 
stimuli with individuals in out-groups—a tendency that when acted on produces problematic, 
maladaptive behaviors.  
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Olsson et al. (2005) highlight an evolutionary idea that humans fear out-groups because 
of the potential danger strangers have historically posed, particularly to ancestral, hunter-gatherer 
communities. In today’s society however, this fear is usually not adaptive. More times than not, 
behaviors based in racial biases are detrimental to the functioning and cohesion of human 
cultures. To be clear, the problem is not human evolutionary tendencies; it is the submission to 
them in circumstances in which they are not warranted. This innate fear of out-groups was once 
perhaps adaptive (and in some situations, still might be), but now humans must employ 
conscious processing to check these natural biases to avoid problematic fear reactions and 
subsequent mistreatment of “out-group” individuals who are not a threat.      
The previous study introduces the human potential for racial bias. Recognizing 
evolutionary bases for such stereotypes and biases is necessary in overcoming them. Sng, 
Keelah, Williams, and Neuberg (2017) identify a key component of evolutionary psychology that 
factors into my integration of this issue with social psychology theory. Essentially, their 
argument is that just because something is an adaptation, does not make it adaptive. In other 
words, evolutionary theory provides explanations for behavior, it does not justify that behavior. 
Therefore, when discussing behaviors based on fear of an out-group, the actions associated with 
such fear are not justified merely because they are evolutionary based. While humans do have an 
evolutionarily basis for fear-induced responses, these actions can still be problematic and 
harmful. Ultimately, recognizing evolutionary tendencies is necessary in order to oppose them 
when reacting automatically to experiences of misled fear.  
Current American society exposes individuals to many members of different out-groups, 
which was not the case throughout human evolutionary history. Over time, the formation of 
	  	   32	  
stereotypes and biases have occurred based on limited experiences with out-group members or 
by culturally transmitted information about them. But, because of current American society and 
its many differences from the societies in which humans evolved, misled reactions to fear of out-
groups are prevalent today. To highlight this argument, I will outline examples in which acting 
on misled fear of the out-group is problematic today.  
Schaller, Park, and Mueller (2003), conducted a study to determine how racial 
stereotypes interact with other innate fears to produce prejudiced actions or cognitions. They 
used stereotypes about danger/crime commonly associated with Black individuals and combined 
these with the human innate fear of darkness. The researchers found that participants 
acted/responded more based on stereotypic beliefs about Black individuals when in a dark 
physical environment. More specifically, implicit association tasks showed stronger associations 
between Black individuals and danger cues for those participants who were literally in darkness. 
This wrongful association was explained by the fact that darkness increases an individual’s 
susceptibility to harm and thus reinforces the need for increased alertness. This increased arousal 
resulted in mis-attributing the true cause of fear/alertness (the darkness) to Black individuals, and 
increased implicit bias responses against them (Schaller, Park, & Mueller, 2003).  
In another study, Greenberg et al. (1990) evaluated religious in-groups and out-groups. 
Participants consisted of those with Christian religious backgrounds. The study increased 
heightened awareness (or fear/anxiety) of participants by implementing mortality salience cues. 
In subjects exposed to these cues, ratings of out-group members (or those belonging to the 
Jewish faith) were evaluated more negatively (Greenberg et al., 1990). Even though the threat 
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did not come from the out-group, more negative associations were attributed to Jewish, out-
group members in the presence of a fear-provoking stimulus.   
A study by Nesdale, Maass, Durkin, and Griffiths (2005), examined the racial out-group 
biases in children between the ages of seven and nine. This study incorporated an in-group 
(White) versus out-group (Black) threat to each participant, as well as a social norm of either 
inclusion or exclusion. The study found that the children in the groups with an exclusion social 
norm disliked out-group members more than those in the inclusive group norm condition when 
no threat was present. In addition, the children in the threat condition also displayed greater 
dislike toward members of the out-group than the children in the no-threat condition (Nesdale et 
al., 2005). This study reinforces the findings of the previous studies (Greenberg et al., 1990; 
Schaller, Park, & Mueller, 2003), but adds to such research with the applicability to child 
participants. Using younger participants who have had less exposure to experiential learning 
opportunities suggests that fear of out-groups and behavioral/cognitive problems associated with 
them occur without extensive socialization and personal observations of explicit discrimination 
or visible displays of implicit bias.  
Here, I am arguing that the unconscious (and sometimes conscious) experience of 
emotions, particularly fear, are major motivators of prejudiced behavior and discrimination. An 
opposing argument might suggest that such behaviors are not the product of an evolutionary fear 
of the out-group, but rather conscious or learned beliefs about that out-group and its members. 
While I do not reject the potential for this entirely, a meta-analysis by Talaska, Fiske, and 
Chaiken (2008) suggests that emotions do indeed play a larger role in actions and cognitions 
associated with racial bias.  
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Talaska, Fiske, and Chaiken (2008) found that across studies, emotions were better 
predictors of how individuals actually acted based on racial biases. Cognitively measured beliefs 
and stereotypes corresponded with self-reports of such beliefs and stereotypes, but did not 
correspond to observations of behavior. Emotional prejudices (i.e. emotions negatively 
associated with a particular group), however, were more influential on observable discriminatory 
actions than were the stated (or self-reported) beliefs and stereotypes (Talaska, Fiske, & Chaiken, 
2008). In the efforts for a more favorable evaluation of one’s self, self-reports may be skewed 
toward the maintenance of this positive perception. For this reason, it is possible that the often 
unconscious experience of emotions is what allows fear and other related emotions to be so 
influential in such problematic ways.  
Another study by Pearson, Dovidio, and Pratto (2007) looked at the mediating effects of 
emotions, such as fear and anger behaviorally, in legal decisions, such as in punitive measures 
suggested for Black perpetrators of crime. In fictional scenarios presented to White participants, 
researchers manufactured news stories in which Black individuals severely injured a White 
individual. In one story, the attack was initially provoked by the White male, while in the other 
story, the attack was unprovoked. The reported and measured emotions of anger and fear were 
the largest predictors of lengthier recommended prison sentences in both conditions. The attack 
provocation variable mediated responses somewhat, but implicitly measured racial prejudice 
predicted more negative responses (i.e. longer sentences/death penalty suggestions) from the 
White participants regardless of the provocation (Pearson, Dovidio, and Pratto, 2007). This study 
highlights the problematic combination of implicit racial biases and negative emotions, such as 
fear, to beliefs about out-group members and even political or legal actions, such as the support 
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of punitive measures. Overall, Pearson, Dovidio, and Pratto’s (2007) study supports the notion 
that fear of out-group not only contributes to the formation of internal prejudices and biases, but 
this fear actually facilitates actions that have the potential to adversely impact members of the 
out-group.  
Goldman (2017) conducted a study that examined the effects of a different type of fear on 
behavior. It is linked with fear of the out-group, and manifests primarily based on racial 
stereotypical beliefs. Goldman calls this fear, fear of racial favoritism. Goldman’s study found 
that in the 2014 presidential election, White voters perceived Black politicians as more likely to 
favor Blacks over Whites, and this stereotypical belief decreased support for Barack Obama. 
Essentially, Goldman (2017) argues that fear of racial favoritism centralizes on the fact that there 
is a possible expense to in-group interests. Rather than political action and support/opposition of 
political officials being solely based in racial prejudice or bias, this stereotypical fear of racial 
favoritism at the expense of Whites is a motivating force, too (Goldman, 2017). Regardless, acts 
associated with this fear can produce adverse outcomes, such as White opposition to Black 
political leadership.  
Fear of racial favoritism has no conceivable basis, especially within politics. In analyses, 
Goldman (2017) finds no evidence of Black politicians strategizing to the detriment of Whites. 
Rather, people of color running for office tend to overtly appeal to all racial groups in order to 
combat this fear of racial favoritism and receive more support from all groups of people. This 
misled fear is a maladaptive behavioral outcome that adversely influences the ability for a person 
of color to successfully obtain an elected position. This example is one of many ways in which 
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fear of the out-group and other misled fears promote problematic cognitions and behaviors 
adversely affect out-group members, who are consistently members of minority groups.   
Other Misled Fears and their Interaction with Fear of the Out-Group. Implicit bias 
and stereotypes are not the only contributors to misled fear and its problematic behavioral 
responses. As Wilson and DeBecker both allude to, reasonable mistakes can be made when 
generally mis-perceiving threatening stimuli. Because it is to the benefit of humans to over-
perceive threats rather than under-perceive, this tendency itself poses problems in social 
environments (Park, 2012). External factors such as physical darkness (Schaller, Park, & 
Mueller, 2003) and stress can promote misled fear reactions by limiting the human conscious 
ability to differentiate between what is a threat and what is not.  
A study by Neta, Cantelon, Haga, Mahoney, Taylor, and Davis (2017) evaluated the idea 
that stressful situations can alter human perceptions of those situations, thus influencing their 
cognitions and behaviors. This study used a threat of shock to create a sense of anxiety or arousal 
in participants. This anticipated shock increased participant stress levels and impacted their 
performance on the task compared to those in the safe condition, or the condition where no threat 
of shock was present. The task involved rating surprised facial expressions as positive or 
negative. Participants in the threat of shock condition reliably rated the ambiguous faces more 
negatively than those in the safe condition (Neta et al., 2017). These findings are consistent with 
False Alarm Theory (Park, 2012). It is costlier to miss threatening stimuli than to over-perceive 
them. Because of this, states of heightened awareness or arousal from fear or anxiety induce 
more negative associations and perceptions. Evolutionarily this is adaptive, but in social 
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situations, or in professions such as first responders or military personnel, this can be 
maladaptive (Neta et al., 2017). 
Correll, Park, Judd, and Wittenbrink (2002) conducted a study that identifies the severity 
of problematic outcomes from misled fear. This study combines the stress variable present in the 
Neta et al. (2017) with behavioral outcomes associated with fear of the out-group to discuss how 
police officers have a misleading tendency to use racial cues as a way to evaluate a threatening 
situation. This multi-part study evaluated participants’ abilities to accurately identify threatening 
individuals in ambiguous scenarios. Using an interactive video game, participants were exposed 
to White and Black individuals and were instructed to shoot those individuals holding a weapon 
and to not shoot those who were unarmed.  
The results of this study found that participants reacted more quickly to shoot a Black, 
armed target than they did White, armed targets. In addition, participants had slower reaction 
times when not shooting an unarmed, Black target, than they did for not shooting an unarmed, 
White target. A second part of this research found that participants mistakenly shot at unarmed 
Black targets more than they did unarmed, White targets. Finally, participants also failed to shoot 
at armed, White targets more than they failed to shoot at armed, Black targets. Correll et al. 
(2002) concluded that racial cues interact with decision-making processes in threatening, but also 
in ambiguous situations. Reasonable speculation suggests that stereotypes surrounding Black 
individuals and violence as well as fear of the out-group promoted this behavior in White 
participants.  
Correll et al. (2002) is evidence for the potential of misled fear to produce extremely 
harmful outcomes in society. This study in particular discusses effects that potentially translate to 
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police violence toward Black men in particular. But other less obvious effects can be detrimental 
as well, such as the avoidance of members of an out-group. This ostracization has immense 
consequences for humans as social beings. Misled fear reactions contribute to systemic problems 
of racism and overt discrimination in American society. Evolutionary tendencies related to fear 
of the out-group are so deeply ingrained that they are difficult to recognize let alone resist or 
extinguish. Navarette, Olsson, Ho, Mendes, Thomsen, and Sidanius (2009) discuss this difficulty 
in extinguishing fears associated with out-groups.  
Navarette et al. (2009) expand on previous research that suggests humans resist fear 
extinction to members of out-groups. In their study, Navarette et al. (2009) conditioned 
participants to fear images of White and Black American male and female faces by pairing the 
presentation with a loud noise and mild shock. In combination with the findings of Olsson et al. 
(2005), Navarette et al. (2009) suggest that not only are conditioned fear responses resistant to 
extinction for out-group faces (White participants resist Black faces and Black participants resist 
White faces), but there was a gender component to this as well. Essentially, this study found that 
the most difficult fear stimuli to extinguish were those racial out-group, male faces. Navarette et 
al. (2009) speculate that this could be due to the evolutionary consideration that men have 
historically been the perpetrators of violence, and thus it has been beneficial that humans 
continue to fear male, out-group members more than female, out-group members. 
So, fear responses can be problematic. Fear of the out-group in particular poses major 
problems in society today. These problems manifest in the form of negative stereotyping, overt 
racial prejudice, and discrimination. But, they also manifest in the form of avoidance or 
unconscious ostracization of out-group members. As social beings, this adversely impacts out-
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group populations psychologically and emotionally. But, the cognitive effects of misled fear can 
translate into behavioral effects that physically harm out-group members, such as in the case of 
police violence, or the shooting of unarmed black men. Later in this paper, I will discuss other 
ways societal systems, such as the media, perpetuate physical and psychological harm to 
minority groups, specifically. First, however, I will discuss several ways in which humans can 
recognize and resist the influence misled fear of the out-group. Even though such fear 
associations are extremely difficult to extinguish, it is possible to recognize the fear, before the 
unwarranted responses results.  
Social Psychology Based Solutions to Misled Fear. Henry and Hardin (2006) identify 
the contact hypothesis as a potential solution for improving implicit bias against out-groups. In 
their two-part study, Henry and Hardin (2006) found that civil intergroup contact between 
Christians and Muslims, and Whites and Blacks, decreased displays of explicit prejudice from 
both sides. Although, implicit bias was only mitigated through intergroup contact for Blacks 
towards Whites and for Muslims towards Christians. So, this study suggests facilitating contact 
between two “opposing” groups is not enough.  
Gavin DeBecker (1997) proposes three steps that should be utilized by humans to 
decrease the misperceptions and non-productive anxieties associated with fear. First, he says 
when experiencing fear, listen to your intuition, for it was provoked by something. Second, when 
no fear is present, do not manufacture the emotion. Essentially, if no threat is present but a state 
of anxiety or worry occurs, recognize that there is no action warranted and that this is non-
productive fear. Third, if worry or similar emotions are occurring, seek to understand why before 
acting on them. Through these steps, DeBecker (1997) emphasizes the necessity of human 
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intuition but does not advocate for immediate action in response to it. His steps permit 
unconscious processing to influence behavior in situations of imminent danger, but they 
recognize that the sources of fear are not always legitimate.  
Timothy Wilson (2002) addresses this problem even more directly. While he too accepts 
the functional value of fear through the adaptive unconscious, he emphasizes the potential for 
mistake that is present in solely unconscious (and sometimes even in conscious) processing. 
Wilson advocates for conscious processing to consistently be the mediator of the adaptive 
unconscious. In comparison to DeBecker, Wilson proposes more reliance on conscious 
evaluations than on the adaptive unconscious.  
But, in addressing solutions to misled fear, Wilson (2002) still questions whether humans 
can rely on introspection from consciousness to accurately serve as a check on the adaptive 
unconscious. He argues that humans have limited introspective access—they can access the 
results of mental processes (the behaviors and cognitions), but not the mental processes, 
themselves, that created the resulting behaviors and cognitions. In the case of human bias and 
prejudice, this method of introspection will generally not be useful (Wilson, 2002). Studies 
previously discussed identify the shortcomings of the human ability in recognizing their own 
implicit biases, and how self-reports of attitudes and beliefs toward out-groups do not accurately 
reflect in observations of behavior (Talaska et al., 2008).  
Because of this, Wilson (2002) argues that human can use observations of their own 
behaviors to infer conclusions about why they are acting the way they are. In other words, the 
adaptive unconscious drives many behaviors outside of human awareness, and potentially the 
only source of information for why humans act in certain ways is through the observation of 
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those behaviors. Therefore, when evaluating for bias and prejudice, it can be useful to observe 
behavior, because these often produce visible, negative behavioral outcomes. In observing such 
behaviors, human beings can potentially better understand their own implicit attitudes (Wilson, 
2002).  
But, using this behavioral observation strategy is also not always an effective tool. 
Wilson (2002) states that individuals often fall prey to inaccurate causal reports of their own 
actions. There seems to be an illusion of authenticity about human beings and their evaluations 
of their own actions. Humans tend to use behavioral observations to falsely conclude why they 
performed a particular action. Ultimately, Wilson argues that both introspection and behavioral 
observation can be misleading, particularly when fear or other types of arousal are factors, as 
logical reasoning and consciousness are compromised which imposes a greater risk of inaccurate 
causal associations.  
If fear and its associated processes are often flawed, the adaptive unconscious drives 
reactions to this emotion instinctively, and humans have no hope for intervening because 
introspective abilities are limited, what can be done to avoid misled and manipulated fear? 
DeBecker (1997) and Wilson (2002) argue that not all hope is lost in this pursuit. While it is a 
valid point that introspective abilities are limited, the responses of the adaptive unconscious or 
human intuition can be overridden. Wilson (2002) identifies this conscious override as an 
important capability of humans that should be utilized more often, while DeBecker (1997) 
suggests that humans use this ability more than they probably should. DeBecker states that 
humans will often experience fear and try to explain it away. By doing this, failure to react to the 
potential danger is possible and this could be detrimental to survival. Alternatively, though, as 
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Wilson (2002) might suggest, conscious intervention may work to reduce prejudiced behaviors in 
the case of modern mis-attributions of fear of an out-group.  
In conclusion, managing unconscious processing of fear requires balance. While the 
emotion is adaptive, it can be misled. For this reason, humans need to recognize the potential for 
overriding unconscious behaviors and utilize this ability when necessary. But, it is also important 
not to ignore the emotion of fear or try to explain it away, as it is adaptive and evolutionarily 
developed to respond to the perception of a threat. Being aware of this balance is the first step to 
achieving an understanding of the emotion of fear. Human internal processing systems can 
promote misled fear, but external influences also play a role in misled, manufactured, 
manipulated fear. While it is important to recognize the potential flaws in human fear processing 
mechanisms, it is also important to understand the methods in which external forces may be 
intentionally or unintentionally manipulating and manufacturing fear to fulfill personal agendas. 
The next section will introduce the role of mass media in American society and highlight theories 
grounded in social psychology that identify ways in which it directly or indirectly influences the 
behavior of media consumers.  
Social Psychology and the Media 
 Mass media incorporates many different types of modes, including television, radio, 
internet, social media, and more. And within these avenues there exists different types of media, 
including entertainment, news, advertising, among other things. The information discussed in the 
paper is relevant to all types of media, however, it will only specifically highlight some of those 
categories listed previously. Because of the variety of messages and methods of broadcasting, it 
is difficult to define media generally. But, in most cases, mass media serves the purpose of 
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increasing awareness about the current environment in which consumers live (Bryant & 
Thompson, 2002). Whether its entertainment television media, or newspaper advertising, 
consumers are gathering outside information relevant to their current society.  
The media provides information that allows viewers/readers to make better sense of their 
outside environment, and sometimes themselves. It promotes the transmission of social norms 
and customs to individuals of a society and produces other benefits, such as escapism and 
anxiety reduction in some cases. The media is an outlet by which members of the public can be 
informed, but also distracted from the rigors of daily life (Bryant & Thompson, 2002). Media is 
an integral part of American society and the functioning of the members within it. The ability to 
have access to vast amounts of information quickly promotes knowledge and awareness, but it 
also introduces problems to unaware viewers. All forms of media impose potential influences on 
consumers, behaviorally and cognitively. This section will serve as a general introduction into 
the institution of the mass media and highlight some of the theory-based ways in which 
consumption of the media influences behavior.  
 The media is selective in what it portrays to consumers. The content is often what the 
media source views as the most important information or what they think the viewers will find 
most entertaining. In addition, messages are constructed and thus, represent how that media 
source views a situation or current issue. This agenda-setting introduces bias into the message 
transmission, as every media source likely varies in its perceptions of events and issues. One 
network, or group of producers, may choose to include certain facts while ignoring others, which 
then skews the information communicated to the general public in a way that is consistent with 
the values deemed important by the media source.  
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Additionally, consumers of media selectively seek out and retain information. In order to 
avoid dissonance with their personal beliefs, viewers selectively confront certain pieces of 
information and dismiss others that create internal cognitive inconsistencies. Similarly, media 
coverage itself may selectively address topics that are consistent with external societal standards 
and beliefs in order to avoid dissonance at a societal level (Severin & Tankard, 2001). This 
confirmation bias poses problems for how media messages are received by the public and 
portrayed by the media. In conclusion, viewers of media rarely have the full scope of 
information. Although this is often unintentional, it presents a major issue for consumers of the 
media. For these consumers, it is necessary to understand such limitations and biases in order to 
accurately evaluate the information provided and consequently act on it.  
Even with these problems, the media is a source of information that provide a great 
advantage to the public in the United States and internationally. Its functions are vital to the 
operation of American society (DeFleur & Ball-Rokeach, 1989). The vitality of mass media is 
what creates such a heavy reliance on it from the general public, government officials, 
corporations, and other parties. Media consumption is increasingly popular and almost inevitable 
in modern society. The media is now the primary method of passing along information regarding 
politics, economic matters, and current events among other things. The public relies on the media 
for information, but also for entertainment. Because of this, it is important to highlight the way in 
which viewers are susceptible to manipulation by and through the media, emotionally and 
behaviorally.  
One of the original ways in which the media was though to influences human behavior is 
through bullet theory. This theory hypothesizes the effects media has on viewers by discussing 
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viewer vulnerability to communicated messages and stating that if a message “hits its target,” it 
will have its desired effect (Severin & Tankard, 2001). In other words, this theory expresses 
viewers as essentially passive recipients of constructed messages and thus, as highly susceptible 
to the intended effects of such messages. Overall, this over-simplified explanation brings up 
more questions than answers, but was the basis for further research regarding how media 
messages do ultimately impact audiences.  
Another proposed method for how the media influences behavior is through Bandura, 
Ross, and Ross’ (1961) social learning theory. The original study’s findings supported the 
existence of the imitation of specific behaviors without reinforcement. In other words, the 
researchers found that individuals could learn to act in a certain way merely through observation, 
particularly in children observing adults. Imitation resulted for aggression responses and non-
aggression related imitations (Bandura, Ross, & Ross, 1961). Considering the applicability of 
such imitation effects to the media presents many problems for viewers, particularly children. 
The application of this theory to the media is known as Modeling Theory and the extent to which 
such observational learning occurs through media sources is largely unknown, but behavioral 
influences in this way are plausible (DeFleur & Ball-Rokeach, 1989). 
In addition to the potential effects from the bullet and modeling theories, the media 
contributes to socialization—the process by which individuals are introduced and thus, adapt to 
societal functions and beliefs. Socialization’s goal is to produce conformity and social order 
within the members of society. It essentially provides individuals with the knowledge of what are 
acceptable actions/beliefs within the culture or society in which they live. Therefore, it 
encourages the acceptance of pre-existing standards and promotes the stability of ideals (DeFleur 
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& Ball-Rokeach, 1989). Mass media has become the ultimate source of socialization in the way 
it portrays American ideals, beliefs, and permissible behaviors. Individuals in society are 
constantly exposed to the life lessons or scenarios reported on by the media, and therefore, it has 
the potential to become a teacher to unknowing viewers (DeFleur & Ball-Rokeach, 1989). This 
unintentional influence can be beneficial, but simultaneously problematic, particularly when the 
messages transmitted are not fully representative of reality or are intentionally manipulative. One 
example of socialization through the media is in the common portrayals of romantic 
relationships. If, for example, the majority of romantic relationships depicted in most forms of 
the media are heterosexual (which I would argue are), this constant exposure to heterosexual 
relationships, with limited exposure to homosexual relationships would reinforce the 
norm/standard that heterosexual relationships are most prevalent and culturally accepted.  
Another way emotions and behaviors may be impacted by media messages is through 
their ability to define social expectations. While socialization by the media potentially influences 
consumers to conform to society’s pre-existing standards, the media can also create or convey 
social expectations. Individual consumers then strive to live up to these expectations in order to 
be accepted within society. The problem with the media as the institution that conveys and 
possibly even sets some social expectations relates back to the problems with how the media 
inherently functions. Social expectations theory states that the media conveys information 
regarding acceptable social conduct and this directly shapes the behavior of viewers (DeFleur & 
Ball-Rokeach, 1989). This is problematic because only selective information is presented by the 
media, therefore, only certain ideals and norms are represented and only those that are 
represented can influence behavior. If the media is proposing acceptable social conduct, the 
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media has the potential to produce misleading expectations that will then guide the behavior of 
those viewing (DeFleur & Ball-Rokeach, 1989). For example, if the majority of female actresses 
are displayed with a consistent body type (perhaps, tall and thin), this might set the expectation 
for female viewers that the social standard is to be tall and thin. This is a misrepresentation of 
what the average body type is and provides females with an unrealistic/inaccurate view of 
societal expectations for figures.  
In conclusion, the media functions as a source for modeling new behaviors, reinforcing 
others, and setting expectations for viewers to conform to (DeFleur & Ball-Rokeach, 1989). 
These theories regarding how the media has the potential to influence behavior are central to the 
focus of this section—the media as a manipulator and influencer of human behavior through the 
emotion of fear. The next section will discuss the use of fear by the media and how this usage 
has been seen to directly impact media consumers.  
Fear in the Media 
Before consumers have that opportunity though, they must recognize the culture they live 
in and how the media operates within this culture. Jason Whitehead states a “culture of fear is an 
underlying pattern of behavior related to the emotion of fear that is seen in how we interact and 
interrelate with the world around us” (Whitehead, 2013, p. 29). He argues that within the United 
States a culture of fear—the general acceptance of this emotional state as the guide for thoughts 
and actions—exists and pervades daily human functioning. The emotional basis of this culture of 
fear is unease and pessimism. These negative feelings are perpetuated by the media. To a certain 
extent, the information the public constantly receives gives good reason for this underlying state. 
Whether it’s a terror attack on television news, the most recent crime details in print newspaper, 
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a natural disaster trending on social media, or a government shutdown written about in the lastest 
online article post, Americans are constantly given reasons to be fearful (Whitehead, 2013).  
Whitehead (2013) describes fear as a powerful motivator. While anxiety creates 
uncertainty and often times the inability to act, fear forces action. Forcing action can be 
beneficial, but when fear is provoked unnecessarily, the action that follows is often unwarranted. 
This type of fear motivates action that otherwise may not have occurred, and this action is 
probably not a beneficial one. Whitehead states that the quick, instinctual motivation to act (or 
Wilson’s adaptive unconscious) is what makes manipulating the actions that follow so simple. 
The feeling of fear produces the desire for the relief from this unpleasant emotion. When human 
lives become preoccupied with alleviating fear, insecurity and vulnerability become the 
cornerstones of existence (Whitehead, 2013). This is the embodied emotion of fear. It pervades 
human consciousness and sends imaginations running wild. In this way, fear has become less 
evolutionarily adaptive and more something that human beings must learn to cope with. The 
media not only perpetuates this experience of fear, but capitalizes on it. News networks report on 
the crime stories of the day because that is what will be most arousing for viewers. Politicians 
utilize the media to relay frightening messages in order to then present a solution to the imminent 
danger and win over viewers. Other messages and current events of disasters, deaths, and 
discrimination plague headlines and images forming an ever present negative cognition in the 
minds of media consumers. Recognizing this media reality is the first step for individuals to 
reclaim fear with its adaptive purpose and begin to recognize (and dismiss) imagined or 
sensationalized fears. 
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 Sometimes, the media provocation of human fear serves the purpose of increasing 
attention to the current media stimulus. Other times, this provocation has an intended outcome 
for media consumers. Lull and Bushman (2015) conducted a study that looked into how such 
provocations of fear succeed in increasing arousal to the stimuli, but failed at producing the 
desired outcome. Their study focused on the presentation of violent and sexual media. The 
participants in this study who were exposed to such media, overall, remembered the content of 
the media better than those without violence and sex cues. The increased arousal effect of such 
media was supported, but in an advertising context, those ads that used sexual and violent cues, 
did not sell their product more effectively. While a consumer/participant was more attentive to 
the ad, they were less likely to purchase the product, perhaps due to how negatively they 
evaluated these types of advertisements (Lull & Bushman, 2015).  
This study does not support heightened arousal’s influence on consumer behavior, but it 
does have other important implications. Lull and Bushman have identified an important behavior 
of media consumers when viewing emotionally arousing media: narrowed attention. While this 
influence did not sway consumer behavior toward purchasing products in this study, other effects 
from this increased/narrowed attention will be discussed from later studies.  
One general way in which the media uses consumer fear to obtain a specific outcome is 
through attitude change. Fear can be invoked through media messaging to persuade consumers 
one way or another. Essentially, if fear is provoked and consumers are motivated to reduce that 
unpleasant experience, attitude change toward the topic associated with the fear can occur 
(Aronson, Wilson, & Akert, 2013). But, this utilization of fear has limits. If the fear is too 
overwhelming, it can become non-productive. In other words, if fear provoked by the media 
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seems too horrific or impossible to diminish, consumers will consciously oppose attending to the 
stimuli in an effort to reduce fear in that way (Aronson, Wilson, & Akert, 2013). Thus, fear can 
be an effective and ineffective tool in promoting attitude change. 
Bryant and Thompson (2002) add to this discussion of fear use for attitude change, and 
thus behavior change. They argue that attitude changes commonly result in changes in behavior 
toward the source by two major models. The first model is known as the reasoned action and 
planned behavior model. Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) created this model which theorizes that 
people act based on their own attitudes and their perceptions of how others will receive their 
action. Therefore, people try to behave in ways that are both consistent with their own attitudes 
and social norms, so that they will be internally consistent and be received positively in society. 
In many cases, attitudes about behavior are therefore compatible with social norms to maintain 
internal consistency (Bryant & Thompson, 2002).  
The second model is known as the automatic activation model. Proposed by Fazio, 
Sanbonmatsu, Powell, and Kardes (1986), this model suggests that the activation of certain 
attitudes promote behaviors to immediately and reliably follow. This model presents attitudes as 
having a powerful influence on behavior. From this model, when attitude change does occur 
using fear tactics, the automatic behavioral implications detailed from this model may be 
associated with fear. Fear and attitude change have an interesting relationship. The use of fear for 
attitude change requires the balance of invoking the emotion, but not in too severe of a way that 
the response is avoidance. But, when attitude change is produced by fear, the behavioral effects 
suggested by the reasoned action and planned behavior model and the automatic activation 
model are sometimes highly dependent on social norms and other times automatic responses, 
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respectively. Altogether, fear as the motivator for attitude change has the potential to influence 
human behavior in a variety of ways. A study by Gleicher and Petty (1992) highlight this 
potential.  
Gleicher and Petty (1992) examined the influence of fear arousal from media on attitude 
change. Specifically, this study looked at the likelihood of attitude change when reassurance of 
the effectiveness of a proposed solution was included in a stimulus that also invoked fear. 
Participants listened to a radio broadcast about the prevalence of crime on campus as the study’s 
method of invoking fear. There was a low fear condition (control group) and a moderate fear 
condition. After the crime broadcast, participants read a newspaper article that discussed the 
possible implementation of a crimewatch program that would address the campus crime issue. In 
one newspaper condition, there were written remarks that provided reassurance of the 
effectiveness of the implementation of this program; the other newspaper condition provided 
vague remarks regarding how effective this program would be at reducing crime. Additionally, 
some participants were presented with weak arguments while others strong arguments for the 
presentation of the persuasive message to implement the program (Gleicher & Petty, 1992).  
Overall, participants in the low fear condition used the arguments themselves and the 
statement of expected results of the program to induce attitude change. In other words, if the 
program was not clearly stated to be effective, and the argument for its implementation was 
weak, attitude change rarely occurred. On the other hand, for participants in the moderate fear 
condition, even a weak argument with a clearly stated expectation of effectiveness was shown to 
promote attitude change in participants (Gleicher & Petty, 1992). Here is evidence for the 
influence of fear on attitude change. When fear was evoked, participants cared less about the 
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strength of the argument for the specific program and cared most about decreases the source of 
their fear (the campus crime). Logic is somewhat lost when emotion, especially fear, takes over. 
Using fear tactics, consumers of the media can be persuaded toward ideas or attitudes they 
otherwise might not be, if the media messaging had not invoked the emotion.  
In conclusion, the media provokes fear in two general ways. First, an unintentional 
provocation occurs frequently and this contributes to the culture of fear present in current society 
(Whitehead, 2013). This is fear misled by the media. Examples and implications of this misled 
fear will be discussed next. Additionally, the media uses fear intentionally to either increase 
attention toward the topic of the message, or obtain a specific behavioral outcome from viewers 
through attitude change or similar means. This is fear manipulated by the media. Examples and 
implications of manipulated fear will be discussed later in this paper.  
Unintentional Use of Fear in the Media 
 News Media. Fear is misled unintentionally through visual and auditory news media. 
Crisis news in particular facilitates non-productive fear/anxiety and contributes to the idea of a 
culture of fear (Whitehead, 2013). In times of societal crises, the media plays an important role 
for the public. For example, during a natural disaster, individuals across the world rely on news 
broadcasting to become informed about the daily occurrences in the area affected. This coverage 
reduces tensions surrounding the event through the information provided about the people and 
place affected, and promotes solidarity among viewers and those experiencing the crisis (Bryant 
& Thompson, 2002). While these are major benefits of crisis news, major psychological 
complications and behavioral influences are also associated with such coverage.  
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In times of crises, events are repeatedly covered because media networks recognize the 
public’s interest and concern for the matter. Many individuals want this around-the-clock 
coverage to stay updated on the current situation, which most of the time does not involve them 
personally. Unexpected results can unintentionally occur from the over-covering of crisis-like 
events. Constant reminders of the current events can evoke large amounts of stress and even fear 
in individuals, who again, are hardly, if at all, impacted by the situation (Bryant & Thompson, 
2002). From this, a culture of fear is further perpetuated and individuals perceive such events as 
more likely than they truly are. In addition, negative emotions associated with fear such as 
anxiety and panic may occur when no threat is physically affecting most viewers. This effect is 
not limited to the coverage of crises. DeBecker (1997) addresses the effects of general news 
stories as he explains the media as the way in which many people perceive the world on a global 
and local scale.  
News media, specifically, strives to report the most arousing and exciting stories of the 
day or week. Author Richard Saul calls the local news “a list of inexorable deaths, accidents, and 
catastrophes—the violent wallpaper of our lives” (DeBecker, 1997, p. 312). As the news 
describes victim after victim of crimes in our local and global communities, viewers become 
victims to the sensationalism of the danger presented in this form of media. These three 
headlines provide a few examples from the plethora of similar headlines. All three derive from a 
medium-sized news organization out of South Bend, Indiana.  
•   “Attempted abduction reported Tuesday in Bridgeman” (WNDU, April 10, 2019) 
•   “People in 2 vehicles reportedly exchange gunfire in South Bend” (WNDU, April 
9, 2019) 
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•   “Police investigate home invasion, robbery on Mishawaka’s east side” (WNDU, 
March 29, 2019) 
Endless headlines of shootings, animal attacks, and home break-ins reinforce the ideas of 
these tragic events. These reports become the general perceptions of the world. They are 
engrained in human memory and then used to process information at later times. Local news, as 
well as crisis news, has programmed fears in humans toward events that individuals have never 
personally been affected by (DeBecker, 1997). Continuous exposure to adverse news stories, and 
crisis news, skews the public perception of reality. The consistency with which tragic events are 
reported can lead viewers to believe such events are more common than they actually are. 
Ultimately, humans have a distorted view of what is actually a threat in daily life (DeBecker, 
1997).  
In psychology, Tversky and Kahneman (1974) call this phenomenon the availability 
heuristic. It states that individuals make judgments about the frequency or likelihood of an event 
occurring based on the number of examples they can recall. In other words, frequent exposure to 
crime-related news stories would allow for the general public to be able to recall more of these 
stories quickly. This promotes the inaccurate judgment that such crime is more prevalent than it 
actually is (Tverksy & Kahneman, 1974). This unintended consequences of the availability 
heuristic is reviewed in the following paragraphs.  
One study by Solloway, Slater, Chung, and Goodall (2013) examined the effects of crime 
and accident news stories on individuals’ emotions and how their evoked emotions consequently 
influenced support for public policies. For this study, researchers exposed participants to 
newspaper stories that detailed violent crimes, motor vehicle accidents, and other accidental 
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injury stories. Participants free wrote the thoughts that occurred to them while reading through 
the news stories and experimenters coded these responses according to whether or not the 
emotions of fear, anger, or sadness was evoked. The researchers used alcohol consumption as a 
causality factor in some of the news stories.  
In the participants for which alcohol was not a causal factor of the crime/accident stories, 
fear was shown to have a direct relationship with support for new policies and overall personal 
and social concern for such occurrences. In other words, when fear was invoked in participants, 
they were more likely to report a greater amount of personal concern for the issue and a desire 
for new policies to better address the problem (and decrease the source of fear). In the condition 
where alcohol was a causal factor for the reported injuries/crimes, fear did not produce the same 
results. Rather, there was no significant difference between the amount of personal concern or 
the support for new policies in comparison to other groups. Researchers explained this by 
describing the emotion of fear as a result of causative uncertainty. When humans have no 
explanation for potentially harmful events/stimuli, it is instinctive to fear and thus be motivated 
to find a solution to such uncertainty (Solloway et al., 2013).  
Generalizing this study, reading a news story that evokes fear has the potential to increase 
personal concerns, impact daily human functioning, and the cognitions humans produce. I would 
argue based on the discussion above that this fear provocation in the news is already occurring 
and is already influencing human thought and behavior. This is related to Whitehead’s culture of 
fear—humans in modern society are overwhelmed by the amount of exposure to dangerous 
stimuli (even to stimuli that have no first-hand consequences) and a constant state of uncertainty 
and arousal follows. 
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 Not only does a culture of fear promote constant arousal and uncertainty, but it promotes 
the adoption of mistrust or a general belief of meanness about the world. This cognitive 
misinterpretation is particularly relevant in media consumers and has come to be known as the 
Mean World Syndrome (Earp, 2010). In analyses of heavy versus light media viewers, Gerbner 
and colleagues found that heavy viewers developed an unrealistic view of societal dangers after 
consistently consuming media with such an emphasis on violence and fear (Bryant & Thompson, 
2002). Gerbner and colleagues titled this phenomenon the cultivation hypothesis because 
individuals can adopt particular beliefs about reality based on media viewing (Bryant & 
Thompson, 2002). Essentially, fear and anxiety about the surrounding world may depend on the 
amount and type of media exposure, but views about societal violence and crime seem to be one 
area especially influenced by media. This is perhaps not surprising as in one study conducted, for 
two-thirds of Americans, 61% of all news stories focused on crime, accidents, and disasters 
(Earp, 2010).  
The fact that fear responses are initially the product of System 1 or the human adaptive 
unconscious is what subjects them to external manipulation, particularly by the media. And the 
existence of inherent biases, such as the availability heuristic, prove to further problematize the 
consumption of media. For example, media portrayals of Black Americans are influenced by the 
systemic racism of the predominantly White society in which they reside, potentially rooted in 
the innate human fear of the out-group. Adverse portrayals of Black individuals further 
perpetuate racist ideals, especially when combining these adverse portrayals with fear arousal. 
One study by Hurley, Jensen, Weaver, and Dixon (2015) examined the effect negative portrayals 
of Black individuals in the media, had on public perceptions and their beliefs about public policy. 
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One content analysis conducted by Romer, Jamieson, and DeCoteau (1998) found that Black 
individuals are depicted more as criminals than White individuals by observing three major news 
stations (ABC, NBC, and CBS) in the Philadelphia area. This finding is one that is very well 
supported by other research. Hurley et al. (2015) wanted to determine the impact of this 
unfortunate reality on the public.  
 In this study, participants watched seven crime stories in a 30-minute television 
broadcast. They were randomly assigned to one of four conditions: majority Black suspects in 
the crime reports (six Black, one White), majority White suspects (six White, one Black), seven 
stories that did not identify the race of the suspect, and a control condition (no crime stories). 
After viewing the crime reports, researchers evaluated the participants for guilt attribution. 
Results showed that those who viewed the majority Black suspects held those individuals as 
either unable to be rehabilitated or personally culpable for their actions, whereas other conditions 
did not result in the same personally attribution of guilt. Therefore, participants displayed 
stronger adverse reactions to the majority Black suspects in the “majority Black” condition than 
the other three conditions (Hurley et al., 2015).  
 These results depict what is known as the fundamental attribution error: associating a 
behavior primarily with a person and his or her character, rather than considering any external or 
situational factors (Hurley et al., 2015). Overall, this research is important in explaining the 
adverse impact negative portrayals of minority groups have on public perceptions of those 
groups and individuals. Because, the “Black majority” condition of this study is essentially the 
reality of news coverage in many areas, it is increasingly important for media consumers to 
recognize the impact this coverage has on their cognitions and behaviors. As previously 
	  	   58	  
discussed, when consistently connecting minority groups to fear-invoking stimuli such as crime, 
not only might viewers overestimate the prevalence of crime in society, but they may over-
attribute members of minority groups as the perpetrators of those crimes, through the availability 
heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). The problematic cognitive and behavioral effects 
associated with fear of the out-group manifesting in social behaviors, is also perpetuated by the 
media. Content analyses of news coverage of Black Americans is just one way in which the 
media perpetuates negative stereotypes/beliefs about a group of people. 
 As the film The Mean World Syndrome: Media Violence & the Cultivation of Fear (Earp, 
2010) discusses, regardless of racial implications detailed by Hurley et al. (2015), heavy media 
consumers were more likely to view the world as a violent and dangerous place. Although crime 
rates have been dropping for years, in multiple survey studies most Americans report more crime 
in their local area than in previous years (Earp, 2010). This is evidence of the increasingly 
important role the media plays in developing public opinions about society at large. Media is not 
the only factor influencing such public opinions, but it is undeniably a major one. Media does 
influence public opinion and beliefs, but debates continue regarding whether or not violent media 
increases the likelihood for viewers to adopt violent and aggressive behaviors and how 
specifically media influences behavior, if at all. Momentarily ignoring this idea, from this debate 
about violent media and its behavioral affects, Michael Morgan, a colleague of George Gerbner, 
suggests a more important question has been lost. How does media violence influence human 
emotion, particularly fear, and make them vulnerable to manipulation (Earp, 2010)? What are the 
effects of living in a state of fear and anxiety? How does this state influence human thought and 
action? While it is interesting to look at the direct behavioral implications of media consumption, 
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it is perhaps more important to examine how such consumption practices impact cognition and 
emotion, thus indirectly influencing behavior. It is debatable whether or not the media has a 
direct, imitative effect on behavior, particularly adult behavior, but it is well-known that 
cognitions and emotions reliably influence human behavior. For this reason, it is increasingly 
important to identify the ways in which the media affects human thoughts and emotions, then 
consequently behavior.  
Bryant and Thompson (2002) identify factors that have come to complement Gerbner’s 
research on how television viewers, specifically, are influenced by violent or fear-invoking 
media programs. These factors include four components that seem to impact the way in which 
consumers are cognitively and behaviorally affected. These include, program specificity (the 
type of media watched), viewer perceptions or interpretations (varying individual interpretations 
of media programs), personal judgments about crime (beliefs about crime that originated outside 
of media), and situation specificity (individual situational influences) (Bryant & Thompson, 
2002). These levels of judgment affect the way viewers responded toward violent or fear-
inducing media and explain the various ways in which Gerbner’s Mean World Syndrome 
manifests (Bryant & Thompson, 2002). These external factors have the potential to impact 
viewer emotions and emotional responses, thus facilitating Gerbner’s Mean World Syndrome.   
Entertainment Media. The work of Gerbner and his concept of a Mean World 
Syndrome is applied to local, national, and international news, but this idea also pertains 
particularly to entertainment media as well. In all forms of media, the transmission of societal 
and cultural norms is present. But, Gerbner and Gross (1976) argue that in entertainment media 
or dramatic television programming is particularly successful in communicating power dynamics 
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of American society, portraying social norms, and presenting expectations for situational 
outcomes. In other words, television drama, particularly violent drama, gives insight into the 
dynamics and norms of current society. Therefore, Gerbner and colleagues were less interested in 
the imitative effects of such television programming, and more interested in the emotional, 
cognitive, and behavioral effects associated with violent prime-time entertainment media 
(Gerbner & Gross, 1976). To study these effects, Gerbner and Gross (1976) evaluated violent 
television programming, specifically focusing on who (what types of characters) was committing 
the violence, who was victimized, what types of violence are on display, and what are the 
fictional consequences of such acts of violence.  
Using this evaluative criteria, Gerbner conducted a comprehensive content analysis of 
violence portrayed in prime-time and Saturday morning television programming on three major 
networks: ABC, NBC, and CBS. A few notable findings from this analysis include: scenes of 
violence occurred on average, eight per hour, and of all violent episodes, humans were the 
perpetrators of violence 70% of the time (Gerbner, 1971). This content analysis also examined 
leading characters of each program, 67% of which were involved with some sort of violence. 
Additionally, male characters were more commonly the perpetrators of violence while women 
the victims (Gerbner, 1971). Gerbner created a measure known as the Violence Index, which is a 
comprehensive quantifier that sums up the percent of programs containing any violence, the rate 
of violent episodes per program and per hour, the percent of characters engaged with violence 
(either as perpetrators or victims), and the percentage of characters involved in killing (Gerbner, 
1976). Gerbner displays trends of Violence Indices in the major networks evaluated over the 
period of time this content analysis was conducted (see Figure 1).  
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In this research, Gerbner not only identified the frequency with which violent is visible to 
public viewers, but the probably unintentional presentations of societal power dynamics in such 
programming that reinforce problematic notions (e.g. wealthy, White men dominate physically 
and psychologically, and the non-male, non-White and non-wealthy submit or perish). This 
finding further emphasizes the enculturation and socialization that occurs through media, 
specifically the entertainment media that was the subject of Gerbner’s analysis. Overall, 
Gerbner’s work highlights the potential for unconscious takeaways from the public of violent and 
fear-inducing programming. He argues that it not only facilitates a sense of uncertainty, and 
personal vulnerability from his idea of the Mean World Syndrome, but it portrays unjust power 
dynamics in the form of who is commonly depicted as the victimized by violence versus who are 
members of dominant, violence-committing groups (Gerbner, 1976).  
Again, the argument of whether or not violent media directly promotes real-life violence 
is a popular debate. That is the major concern many who recognize how frequent violence is 
portrayed in the media (Earp, 2010). My argument does not center around this issue. Rather, I am 
arguing that it is not human imitative tendencies that should be the most concerning regarding 
media violence. The worry should center around the portrayals of media violence and their 
provocation of human fear even through entertainment media. I am arguing that this fear arousal 
has more evident behavioral consequences than does the potential for imitation of violence from 
the media. 
Gerbner (1984) discusses this problem in an article from USA Today. He argues that it is 
not necessarily the imitation of violence that is the problem, rather, the desensitization toward 
such violent acts and injustices. He states that light viewers of television are less likely to accept 
	  	   62	  
inequity than those who are heavy viewers. This argument is based on Gerbner’s analysis that 
violence displayed in the media often victimizes ethnic minority groups, individuals with lower 
socioeconomic status, and women. Therefore, violent media (whether it be news or entertainment 
based) portrays societal power dynamics and not only desensitizes viewers to violence, but 
cultivates a sense of danger against particular groups, and victimization toward others (Gerbner, 
1984). These human cognitions are problematic in and of themselves, even if they never translate 
into physical behaviors.  
The contribution of Gerbner’s work in understanding the cognitive impacts of violent 
media is substantial. Cantor and Oliver (2004) also touch on the impact of violent entertainment 
media, but more specifically on the cognitions and behaviors of young viewers. From their 
research, individuals who viewed horror films and other related violent media tended to report 
increased beliefs that adverse events were more likely to occur in their own lives, similar to 
Gerbner’s findings (Earp, 2010; Gerbner 1971). Such events evaluated for by Cantor and Oliver 
(2004) included house fires and drowning accidents. Overall, the viewing of horror films and 
violent media by the children in this study resulted in increased beliefs that such events were 
more likely, but parents also reported their child as engaging in more avoidance behavior to 
certain activities to eliminate the possibility of such adverse outcomes. Fear-inducing media has 
far-reaching effects, even when such media is unintentionally provoking fear or in the context of 
fictional, entertainment media. Media consumers need to better understand these effects in order 
to mitigate the behavioral implications associated with consuming fear-evoking media. 
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Intentional Use of Fear in the Media 
 While much fear-inducing media is unintentional, the provocation of fear in the media 
can be intentional as well. Fearful stimuli evoke heightened arousal, even when that stimulus is 
not physically present in the lives of media consumers. By doing this, the media can achieve 
specific agendas and through evoking fear in its viewers, such as increasing attention toward a 
specific program or story, changing attitudes toward a particular person or idea, or enhancing 
perceptual abilities toward a certain political or health-related message. In the next section, I will 
discuss how fear is intentionally manipulated in many ways by various media outlets. First, I will 
discuss how fear is often intentionally evoked in viewers of news programs, especially 
politically-oriented news programs that have the goal of increasing viewer/reader arousal and 
sometimes inducing an attitude change toward a specific topic. In addition to this, I will discuss 
some disturbing and problematic implications associated with fear-induced politically-based 
news coverage. Then, I will discuss how fear arousal can benefit political candidates, and is a 
tactic that has been historically used for this benefit. Finally, I will provide some concluding 
remarks regarding other ways fear is intentionally provoked by the media.  
 This paper has previously discussed how misled or misattributed fear can impose 
problems in social life. I argue these problems are further perpetuated by mass media and its 
selective coverage, advertisements, and general portrayals of individuals, society, and 
government. Media outlets tend to use human fear to fulfill their own agendas, or intentionally 
manipulate fear to attain particular cognitive or behavioral responses. The first area in which 
these effects are prevalent is in the political sphere of the United States. Diebec and LeDoux 
(2004) argue for the existence of the political uses fear. Their question is not whether it occurs, 
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but how. They argue that historical occurrences (e.g. 911) can be powerful influencers when 
furthering political aims. Thus, instilling fear by relating old occurrences or problems to new 
experiences or issues can be influential to the general public’s viewpoint of the issue (Diebec & 
LeDoux, 2004). This technique is used frequently by political news sources. While I am arguing 
that their intentional evocation of public fear may not be entirely conspiratorial, it still has 
adverse impacts media consumers should be aware of.  
Use of Fear in Politically-Based News Coverage. Schemer (2012) conducted a study in 
Switzerland that focused on the evaluation of campaign strategies dealing with immigration or 
asylum-seeking policies. In a survey about the political campaigns, participants reported their 
emotions toward asylum seekers, and their attention toward print political advertising (as 
television political advertising is not permitted). Print advertising involving the immigration 
issue often portray asylum-seekers negatively and discuss wide-ranging consequences of their 
presence in the nation, such as the potential for increased crime or future financial concerns. 
These advertisements reliably evoke fear and anxiety in Swiss citizens, particularly through cues 
toward threatened physical safety or potential financial distress.  
Overall, the results of this study showed that greater attention to political advertising 
increased negative emotions toward the issue of immigration as well as asylum-seekers 
themselves (Schemer, 2012). Additionally, negative affect evoked by political ads was shown to 
increase attention toward the information, as is consistent with previous research discussed (Lull 
& Bushman, 2015). These results portray a reinforcing process in which attention toward 
negative portrayals of immigrants is increased, which then increases negative attitudes about 
immigrants and the issue of immigration. This cyclic process is harmful to how voters 
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cognitively view asylum-seekers, since such viewpoints/perceptions are based mostly on limited, 
emotionally arousing information in print advertising. Such media perpetuates negative affective 
reactions towards immigrants, but additionally has the potential to influence political action in 
the form of support of anti-immigration policies, stricter immigration laws, and even other 
regulations that limit human, asylum-seeker rights (Schemer, 2012). 
George Gerbner commented on this phenomenon within United States politics and within 
the context of his Mean World Syndrome idea. He discusses the fact that Hispanics are an 
extremely underrepresented population in all forms of media (entertainment, news, print, etc.) 
even though they are a numerously prevalent group in reality. Although, when this population of 
individuals is presented by the media, they are often portrayed in an extremely negative way and 
commonly associated with violence (Earp, 2010). The documentary The Mean World Syndrome: 
Media Violence & the Cultivation of Fear, discusses the issue of immigration in the United 
States and how it is portrayed through the media. This film highlights CNN’s Lou Dobbs 
Tonight show as focusing a portion of 70% of its episodes on the matter of illegal immigration. 
The focus of multiple television news networks is on the crimes committed by illegal immigrants 
and the dangers they impose on the United States. Gerbner argues that since there are hardly 
positive representations of Latinos in any form of the media, this negative portrayal in news 
media largely impacts media consumers’ perceptions of the issue of illegal immigration and 
immigrants themselves. Again, the availability heuristic suggests that humans will make 
judgments about issues and groups of people based on the most prevalent and numerous 
information most accessible to them. So, if instant recall includes quotes such as: “millions of 
illegal immigrants in this country. Including many murders and rapists,” (Lou Dobbs, Earp, 
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2010) and “we can’t stop all murders, rapes, and deadly drunk driving accidents, but our officials 
should be doing everything possible to prevent those committed by people who have no right to 
be here,” (Fox News, Earp, 2010), then the general public most likely has an extremely negative 
outlook regarding the concept of immigration, as well as Hispanic immigrants themselves. 
In addition to the adverse cognitive (and potentially behavioral implications) of such 
negative politically-based coverage, within the context of Gerbner’s Mean World Syndrome, it 
makes sense that individuals would overestimate, or misperceive the amount of crime committed 
by illegal immigrants. Indeed, the National Opinion Research Center found the 73% of American 
surveyed reported their belief that more immigrants equated to higher crime rates, when this is 
not the reality. Rather the opposite is show to be true. Cities with the highest prevalence of 
residing immigrants have substantially decreased crime rates, according to FBI data from the 
time of the National Opinion Research Center survey (Earp, 2010). 
It is worrisome to consider how irrational perceptions or fears perpetuated by media 
portrayals of immigrants and immigration impact attitudes and beliefs of the general public, even 
from self-identified opinion political news media. Gerbner identifies that it is often to the benefit 
of politicians to evoke fear and insecurity, as these feelings are usually accompanied by a desire 
for a solution. Such solutions, say, to a fear of illegal immigrants, comes in the form of changing 
immigration policies or other political endeavors which would be beneficial to those holding 
political offices or those seeking political support for proposed policies (Earp, 2010).  
Brader, Valentino, and Suhay (2008) conducted a study to examine how news coverage 
influences mass opinions toward immigration policies. In this study, Brader et al. (2008) used a 
mock New York Times report about the current state of immigration. Each story highlighted the 
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increasing number of immigrants, but the ethnic cues of each story varied by condition. 
Participants either read about White European immigrants or Latino immigrants. In addition to 
this manipulation, some stories focused on the positive effects associated with immigration, 
while others focused on the negative consequences of immigration. Those participants in the 
Latino, negative portrayal condition displayed the greatest opposition to immigration, even more 
than the White European, negative condition. In addition, in the Latino, negative portrayal 
condition, participants more frequently requested information about the issue than those who 
were in positive portrayal condition or the European, negative condition. Also, interestingly, in 
the Latino, negative condition, participants were much more likely than the positive, Latino 
group, the control, and both European ethnic cue groups, to engage in political action against 
immigration by sending an anti-immigration message to a government official.   
 In conclusion, the Brader et al. (2008) study suggests that beliefs about immigrants and 
the issue of immigration were impacted by print media portrayals. White participants had a 
stronger negative emotional reaction in the conditions in which members of an out-group (Latino 
immigrants) were associated/presented with consequences of immigration. In other words, even 
when no actual threat is present, out-group cues elicit a state of anxiety/fear which then 
influences belief systems and political action (Brader et al., 2008). Therefore, emotional 
manipulation through fear and anxiety is especially prevalent regarding an issue like 
immigration, as out-group ethnic cues are prevalent.  
 Human susceptibility to negative emotional associations with the negative media 
portrayals of Hispanics as well as immigration provides insight into the controversial nature of 
this political issue. Anxiety or fear is commonly evoked, out-group ethnic cues are present, and it 
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is beneficial to many politicians to achieve an aroused, uncertain state surrounding this issue that 
motivates a desire for political action. It is evident that the emotional arousal through the media 
is not only influencing the cognitions and beliefs of consumers, but the behaviors associated with 
these beliefs. Resulting behaviors could include advocating for stricter immigration policies, or 
political action, such as a personal appeal to state officials about concern for the issue of 
immigration. Such actions impact immigrants and asylum-seekers, as well as those legally 
present in this country with Hispanic ethnicities by the negative stigma and stereotype 
surrounding Hispanic Americans and the misperception of the prevalence of immigration. This 
type of fear manipulation is not limited to the political issue of immigration or Latino ethnic 
group cues, though. Arabs and Muslims are also a vilified, targeted group by the media.   
The stereotypical terrorist portrayals of Muslims in all forms of the media, but 
particularly television and print news, again, leads to misperceptions regarding Arab individuals 
in American. According the film, The Mean World Syndrome: Media Violence & the Cultivation 
of Fear, over one-third of American believe Muslims in the United States sympathize with Al 
Quaeda and about one-fourth of Americans report not wanting to have a Muslim as a neighbor 
(USA Today/Gallup Poll, 2006, Earp, 2010). This disturbing result could be unfortunately 
facilitated by the prevalence of quotes such as: “Extremist Muslim terrorism. The terrorist 
Muslim extremist. The Muslim extremist terrorist. End of story.” (Fox News, Earp, 2010) and 
“Except for Timothy McVeigh, every terrorist has been a Muslim.” (Fox News, Earp, 2010). 
This portrayal of the Arab population is harmful to the majority of Muslim individuals living in 
the United States who pose no threat whatsoever. Falsely associated an entire group of people 
with an influential fear-inducing stimulus (terrorism), sets up extremely problematic behavioral 
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and cognitive outcomes associated with misled fear perpetuated by the media and its rhetoric 
surrounding the Muslim faith. In addition, media coverage of terrorism in general conveys an 
inconsistent picture to media consumers regarding the true threat terror attacks pose on a daily 
basis. See Figure 2 for an example of overtly misleading news coverage of the concern of 
terrorism.  
As previously discussed through Hurley et al. (2015), Black individuals are another 
population largely misrepresented by the media. Gerbner details that Black men especially are 
connected with drugs, crime, and violence in their media portrayals. Such consistent portrayals 
lead the general public to associate crime more with Blacks than Whites when in reality this is 
not the case (Earp, 2010). One study by Gilliam and Iyenger (2000) further examines the 
influences of local television news on media consumers. This study found that not only does the 
constant exposure to crime from the news media increase viewers’ perceptions of how common 
crime is, but it associates race into the misperceptions surrounding crime. This added element 
influences viewers to increase political support for harsher and more frequent punishments for 
criminals and negatively influence White viewers’ attitudes toward Black individuals in general 
(Gilliam & Iyenger, 2000). The association between portrayals of Black individuals and an 
overly-emphasized connection with crime has visible, harmful behavioral effects for minority 
groups. 
Overall, the intentional provocation of fear in politically-based news coverage is arguably 
not intended to be to the detriment of populations of people. Rather, it is more likely that this 
news coverage invokes fear to achieve viewer arousal, and thus viewer attention to the 
programming. Alternatively, fear may be induced in political news coverage regarding issues 
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such as immigration to provoke an attitude change about the topic. Regardless of the purpose for 
the intentional use of fear, the behavioral and cognitive implications are most likely 
unintentional. But, just because the effects occur without malicious intent, does not justify them. 
Again, it is the role of media consumers to understand the strategies employed by the media in 
order to resist problematic behaviors associated with misled fear.  
In a continued analysis of the media’s use of fear, the intentional use of fear can also have 
intentional cognitive and behavioral outcomes. An example of this might include attitude change 
toward an opposing political candidate that results in voting against that individual. Or, one 
could induce fear toward a certain political issue in order to increase action in support of a new 
policy endorsed that politician. For these reasons and more, political figures have historically 
used fear tactics to obtain specific cognitive and behavioral responses from media consumers. 
Examples and research regarding this reality is discussed in the following section.  
Use of Fear in Political Campaigns. In 1988, George H.W. Bush’s campaign for 
presidency adopted a strategy that utilized the crimes committed by a man named William 
Horton. Knowing that his political rival, Michael Dukakis, had vetoed a bill that did not allow 
those convicted of first-degree murder to obtain furloughs, Bush’s campaign manager used the 
Horton case to the politician’s advantage. After serving parts of his lifetime sentence in the 
Massachusetts’s prison system for first-degree murder, Horton, or “Willie” Horton as he would 
essentially be renamed, was released multiple times through the furlough program. On one of his 
releases in 1986, Horton was driving without a license, was pulled over, and fled immediately to 
avoid the repercussions. In less than a year after his escape, he was arrested for breaking and 
entering, rape, and the physical assault of a homeowner in Maryland. The Bush campaign 
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released advertisements against Dukakis using Horton’s mug shot. The ads played on the fear 
associated with releasing criminals from prison and essentially used Horton’s crimes to suggest 
similar occurrences would result if Dukakis were elected. For an example of such an 
advertisement, see Figure 3. It is uncertain the true impact these advertisements had on voters, 
but regardless, Dukakis lost the election (Blakemore, 2018).  
 Mass media is a platform often used by current politicians or those running for election 
into political offices. Within this electoral system, the use of fear currently is and has been a 
prominent method of obtaining political, financial, and emotional support. Politicians’ 
manipulation of fear by the media poses an ever-increasing problem for consumers and the 
electorate, as the constant access to these fear-invoking stimuli subjects them to emotional 
manipulation and potentially impacts the authenticity of the evaluations of political figures.  
 Weber (2013) examined the direct effects of invoking emotional responses in political 
campaigns. He was interested in how emotional appeals occur in responses to campaign 
advertisements and what political consequences these appeals have on voters and their behavior. 
Weber predicted that anger, sadness, fear, and enthusiasm would be emotional factors most 
associated with political consequences, such as decreased voting participation. The study used 
existing political advertisements from a previous congressional race between John Wilkins and 
David Reade. Each participant was randomly assigned to view one of four ads that provoked 
either enthusiasm, anger, sadness, or fear.  
Anger/fear (consistently co-occurring emotions in this study) were seen as a mobilizing 
while sadness was demobilizing (Weber, 2013). Anger/fear cues increased political participation 
through volunteering and voting. Sadness decreased participation in those same behaviors. 
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Weber also used 2004 presidential campaign advertisements to evaluate similar outcomes. From 
this aspect of the study, fear was shown to decrease political participation and discussion, as well 
as overall interest in political matters. 
 In conclusion, Weber (2013) suggests that when fear alone is invoked, decreased 
political concern results. In an emotional response rooted in sadness, not only does political 
concern decrease, but so do behaviors associated with political action, such as voting. From the 
emotion of anger, political action (e.g. voting and volunteering) actually increases (Weber, 
2013). This study closely connects with previous discussions of fear. Fear is mobilizing when it 
remains in a productive state (or co-occurs with anger), but can become unproductive when an 
individual is overcome by anxiety (or sadness in this case). Regardless, fear has the potential to 
produce many adverse outcomes when invoked in political environments.  
 Another study by Chang (2001) examined the effects of specifically print advertising on 
viewers’ emotions and their subsequent evaluations of the ads and the political candidates 
themselves. Chang’s literature review differentiated between positive and negative 
advertisements. Positive advertising was defined as those ads that identify personal strengths and 
admirable qualities of a candidate, while negative advertising was defined as either an ad that 
specifically attacked an opponent or one that highlighted a weakness of an opposing candidate. 
Positive advertising typically evokes positive emotions, namely hope, pride, and reassurance, 
while negative ads tend to provoke negative emotions such as guilt, anger, and fear.  
 In the study conducted by Chang (2001), six positive and six negative advertisements 
were created all addressing different issues, strengths, and weaknesses (that would potentially be 
present within a fictional campaign). Each participant viewed one positive or negative ad for 
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Candidate A and one for Candidate B. Examples of topics presented, in either a positive or 
negative way, within the ads include, crime, the economy, and the environment. Participants 
viewed both advertisements then were asked to provide open ended responses to what they had 
viewed as well as rate their general attitudes toward the candidates and the ad itself. 
Additionally, participants were asked to rank feelings/emotions associated with their viewing of 
each ad.  
 Chang (2001) found that, as hypothesized, positive ads evoked more positive emotions 
while negative ads evoked negative emotions. Additional analyses showed that the negative 
advertising condition produced significantly more negative cognitions than did the positive 
condition, and consequently, negative cognitions in response to the ads promoted more negative 
candidate evaluations. Because the emotional appeal influences a viewers’ attitude toward the ad 
itself, this attitude (whether positive or negative) is then associated with the candidate, as the 
results of this study would suggest. Thus, the ad-evoked emotion not only influences viewers’ 
evaluations and attitudes toward the ad itself, but the political candidate associated with the ad 
(Chang, 2001). 
 In this study of a fictional campaign, Chang (2001) identified the potential impacts 
negative advertising can have on how viewers subsequently evaluate candidates. The evoked 
negative emotions were associated with the ad and thus the candidate present in the ad. In 
conclusion, negative advertising about a political candidate influenced viewers to more 
negatively evaluate candidates portrayed by such ads. Generalizing this study exemplifies one 
way in which media consumer cognitions, and subsequent behaviors, may be unconsciously 
influenced by fear-inducing stimuli in the media.  
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 Another study by Valentino, Hutchings, Banks, and Davis (2008) examined how specific 
evoked emotions contribute not only to viewer cognitions/evaluations, but to political action. 
This study looked at the emotional effects on political behavior of individuals during the 
campaigning process. In the first part, the researchers induced a particular emotional state in the 
experimental conditions. Participants in these conditions were asked to focus on the current 
presidential election between George W. Bush and John Kerry, and recall an event or experience 
during the campaign process that elicited feelings of either enthusiasm, anger, or fear. After 
invoking these emotions in participants, researchers prompted participants to discover more 
information about the candidates in the election cycle by allowing them time on the candidates’ 
webpages. The variables evaluated for were self-reported attention to the campaign (how much 
each person intended to attend to the campaign in the future), following debates (how much each 
person planned to follow presidential debates), total time spent on all the candidates’ webpages, 
total time spent on each candidate issue-focused webpages, total time spent on the biographies of 
the candidates, and total time per webpage.  
 In both Kerry and Bush’s campaigns, the evoked emotion of anxiety/fear was shown to 
have the greatest effects on future attention intended toward the campaign as well as intention to 
follow presidential debates. All three emotions showed a positive impact on self-reported 
attention, but anxiety or fear had the largest effect. These results suggest that anxiety/fear, 
especially, produces a greater awareness or alertness to the candidates and the election in 
progress. All three emotions (anger, anxiety, and enthusiasm) has negative relationships with 
information-seeking variables, but anger had the largest effect (Valentino et al., 2008). 
Essentially these results show that anger, and to some extent anxiety, produce a reduction in the 
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total time spent information-seeking, but also reduces attention toward seeking information about 
specific issues present within each campaign.    
 In conclusion, this study found that while anxiety and anger, specifically, increase 
attention toward political candidate campaigns and associated political issues, these emotions 
actually decrease the amount of time spent evaluating and seeking out information about the 
campaign candidates or issues. Valentino et al. (2008) explain this result by suggesting that 
anxiety may increase arousal and attention toward threatening stimuli, but rather than broadly 
provoking information-seeking behavior, this emotion limits the scope of learning and focuses in 
on smaller subsets of related information. This finding is consistent with why the experience of 
anxiety as a subset of fear is ultimately non-productive. Experiencing anxiety in response to 
political campaigns does not pose an imminent threat, and therefore humans are not adapted to 
respond in an automatic way that relieves such negative emotions. Ultimately, Valentino et al. 
(2008) suggests that anxiety or fear provoked during political campaigning does not contribute to 
the formation of an informed voter or citizen.  
 Kuhne, Schemer, Matthes, and Wirth (2011) also conducted a study to determine how 
campaign emotional appeals impact political opinions, and thus actions. Kuhne et al. argue that 
initially campaigns use cognitive priming, but also affective priming to induce emotional states 
that influence attitude change toward a specific topic or person. They hypothesized two major 
results. First, that there would be a direct affective impact on the formation of political 
judgments. Second, that attitude formation toward the topic would be impacted based on the 
types of emotions evoked during campaigns. In other words, evoking positive emotions would 
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promote a positive attitude toward a topic while evoking negative attitudes would promote 
negative feelings toward a topic (Kuhne et al., 2011).  
 In this study, Kuhne et al. (2011) used a recent Swiss tax reform political issue as the 
basis for their survey. The participants were evaluated based on their cognitive perceptions of the 
issue (i.e. beliefs regarding the benefits/consequences of the reform) as well as their affective 
responses to it (i.e. feelings/emotions about the reform). As expected, positive emotions towards 
the reform increased the cognitions towards the issue in the form of greater amounts of support. 
Similarly, negative emotions toward the issue predicted low support of participants for that issue. 
This study found that emotions better predicted of how one would evaluate an issue than 
individual statements of approval or disapproval about the issue. Overall, Kuhne et al. (2011) 
supported the existence of direct affective influences on political judgments. They concluded that 
voters were more reliant on emotions than on cognitive functioning to decide what they were in 
support of.  
 The Kuhne et al. (2011) study provides even more evidence that suggests that emotions 
have a greater influence on political action than individual’s realize. When fear (a negative 
emotion) is invoked against another politician, a political issue, or a current political event/crisis, 
the results of Kuhne et al. (2011) suggest that this would have detrimental effects on the public’s 
evaluations, and ultimately, their opinions, of such people, issues, and events. This is a way in 
which the emotion of fear is maladaptive today. It influences not only behavioral responses as a 
means of survival, but it influences attitudes, when this attitude change is not warranted.  
 Namkoong, Fung, and Scheufele (2012) conducted a study that examines this information 
within the context of the United States political system, specifically how emotions influence 
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political participation and news media attention of the public during presidential campaigns. 
Namkoong et al. (2012) used data from the 2004 presidential election to examine news media 
attention to this election, factual political knowledge recall, emotions toward the candidates 
(George W. Bush and John Kerry), and political participation. This study found that television 
news media provokes heightened emotional reactions, and thus influences emotional attitudes 
toward the candidates in presidential elections, as well as toward the important issues present 
during that election. Political knowledge and favorable emotions toward either candidate both 
had significant, positive relationships with political participation. Greater TV news media 
attention displayed a significant, positive relationship toward favorable emotions toward Bush 
and Kerry, but a larger effect was found for Bush. Overall, Namkoong et al. (2012) conclude that 
emotions have am mediating effect on political participation. News media attention increases 
emotion (especially television news) and this in turn influences attitudes and emotions about 
political candidates which motivate a greater amount of political participation when individuals 
are emotionally invested.  
Fear, and other related emotions, contribute to the formation of political opinions and 
judgments of candidates and issues, as well as to the likelihood for political participation/action 
in general. These studies seek to identify the effects of emotions evoked by the media in 
consumer political behavior. In the majority of these studies, emotional influences are neutrally 
expressed. In other words, there is no argument for or against the use of emotion in political 
advertising or media coverage. This paper, however, argues that fear arousal by the media are 
primarily negative because they influence human behavior outside of conscious awareness. I 
would add that such unconscious emotional manipulation is not beneficial to the democratic 
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political process or the voters themselves. Associated behavioral responses are not genuine 
because they are provoked by agenda-setting media networks or politicians who desire specific 
outcomes. Whether than be attaining more votes, raising more money, or persuasion for/against 
various political issues/concerns, the effects of using fear arousal tactics do not cease when 
increased attention toward these issues/elections is obtained.  
So, this section has discussed a variety of political and social problems perpetuated by the 
media. Firstly, the emotional arousal techniques utilized during political campaigning is an often 
unconscious, but effective way to achieve a certain political agenda. Associating fear or other 
negative emotions with another candidate or portions of their platform is a way to increase 
negative attitudes toward the opposing candidate and potentially increase positive attitudes 
toward oneself. In addition, politically-based news coverage generally invokes fear less 
conspiratorially, but produces outcomes that are still problematic for media consumers. While 
fear is useful in promoting attitude change, it also has consequences against the sources of the 
invoked fear, such as asylum-seeking individuals. Overall, the provocation of fear by the media 
for political purposes increases attention of media consumers to current issues, but it also has 
unintended (and sometimes, intended) cognitive and behavioral consequences. Whether it’s a 
belief that Muslims and terrorism are inextricably connected, or the support of stricter 
immigration policies, the cues associated with media portrayals of regular people, political 
figures, or current political issues influences the general public’s perception and behaviors 
regarding them.  
It is worth noting that similar fear tactics are used in and promoted by the media outside 
of politics. Product advertisers and public health campaigns are two examples of industries that 
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often utilize the human emotion of fear to achieve specific outcomes (e.g. incentive to purchase a 
drug or decrease the amount of smokers). While some of these intentions are arguably virtuous, 
they nonetheless provoke fear in an effort to unconsciously promote a certain behavior in media 
consumers. The limited scope of this paper does not allow for further exploration of such uses of 
fear, but the prominence of these fear tactics in advertising and health campaigns required the 
mention of them briefly.  
 It is problematic for media consumers to be unaware of the human susceptibility to such 
emotional manipulation. Whether fear arousal is intentional or unintentional, consumers need to 
come to an understanding of innate emotional processes and what behavioral consequences are 
associated with them. By doing this and employing conscious evaluations of media messages, 
particularly relating to politics or persuasive messages, consumers can better protect themselves 
from behavioral manipulation in the form of fear arousal.  
Resisting Misled/Manipulated Fear 
 How can humans hope to avoid misled and manipulated fear? LeDoux (2014) suggests 
one way to address misled fear is to recognize the difference between behaviors associated with 
unconscious and conscious fear (or System 1 and System 2). LeDoux argues that the fear 
conditioning produces fear responses through System 1 processing. For this reason, unconscious 
experiences of fear are defensive and motivate necessary action. Conscious experiences of fear 
occur but do not motivate or reinforce behaviors. LeDoux describes this difference as “acting 
emotionally” (i.e. unconscious experience) and “being emotional” (i.e. the conscious 
experience). Being emotional serves little purpose. Infants and animals have the capacity to act 
emotionally as this is often beneficial for survival. But, merely being emotional, or maintaining 
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the subjective experience of fear, is not to the human advantage in most cases (LeDoux, 2014). 
LeDoux’s differentiation between the unconscious and conscious experience of fear is important 
to consider. Understanding this difference and how each process (System 1 and System 2) 
operate independently of and in cooperation with each other, gives individuals insight into their 
own potential for misled fear and inappropriate fear responses. Wilson adds to this idea of how 
humans can specifically recognize the unconscious experience of fear and oppose its influence 
on actions.  
 Wilson (2002) provides ways to overcome poor introspective abilities and recognize 
common outcomes of misled fear, such as bias. He discusses the fact that humans must recognize 
the cultural and societal factors contributing to the formation and maintenance of cognitions, 
thoughts, and behaviors. By this, Wilson is suggesting that humans can often accurately assess 
the cause of their emotions, but at other times, their personal and cultural agendas may skew 
assessment abilities. To overcome this, recognizing external influences and removing them as 
much as possible from the introspection process is necessary when experiencing and reacting to 
fear. Similarly, in overcoming bias and prejudice, Wilson argues the humans must be high in 
emotional intelligence, or have the ability “to see through the smoke screen of personal and 
cultural theories” (Wilson, 2002, p. 130). Essentially, this comes down to recognizing “dual 
attitudes,” or addressing both explicit and implicit level cognitions. To do this, humans can use 
the observation of their own behavior and utilize Wilson’s recognition of outside influences to 
overcome the tendency toward false inferences. In addition, Wilson argues that understanding 
the processes by which emotions are misled by reading the psychological literature, humans can 
better protect themselves from misled and manipulated fear.  
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 DeBecker (1997) provides another way to address the experience of fear. He argues that 
it is absolutely necessary to acknowledge feelings of fear, as something has caused them. Yes, 
humans should attend to intuition, but they must also evaluate the situation further to ensure the 
source of the fear is legitimate and a response is required. This may seem entirely achievable 
when experiencing fear in a physically occurring situation. But, when the experience of fear or 
related emotions occurs through the media, the realization of fear and this check on behavior as a 
results of the fear can be even more difficult.  
 To recognize warranted fear evoked by the media requires an understanding of what is 
real and what is manufactured. Frederick Bartlett’s (1934) idea of schemata is necessary to 
consider when attempting to understand what is real. Schemas are essentially cognitive structures 
that assist humans in making sense of incoming stimuli. DeFleur and Ball-Rokeach (1989) call 
schemata “personal organizations organizations of subjective meanings” of things we perceive 
(p.256). Schemata develop throughout lifetime experience and influence behavior according to 
past experiences. Humans tend to categorize information as much as possible because it provides 
a sort of convenience for general understanding. This is necessary to recognize, as coverage that 
provoke fear can easily be categorized with negative stimuli from past experiences or the 
socialization process, and inaccurate understandings of topics or events can be produced from 
negative portrayals. Understanding this human tendency provides a defense against false 
associations and the adverse behaviors that follow them. All in all, schemas are a useful tool for 
evaluating a large amount of information perceived by humans, but can lead to inaccurate 
cognitive associations that are particularly harmful when produced from the emotion of fear.  
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 A final approach to avoiding intentionally manipulated fear, particularly from the media, 
combines the knowledge of schemas and the inherently misleading factors found in the media in 
a process called critical media literacy. Critical media literacy promotes individuals to have the 
abilities to interpret media messages in multiple ways, recognize the inherent portrayal of 
stereotypes and bias, analyze media codes and conventions, discern the dominant values and 
ideologies of various media sources, and thus, more effectively evaluate media content (Kellner 
& Share, 2005). By either incorporating such education into societal learning systems, or placing 
the burden on consumers to understand the educational and socializing abilities of the media, 
viewers could be better equipped to use System 2 processing to more critically address and 
understand the manipulation imposed by media.  
The core principles of critical media literacy include the following: 1) All media 
messages are “constructed”, 2) Media messages are constructed using a creative language with 
its own rules, 3) Different people experience the same media message differently, 4) Media have 
embedded values and points of view, and 5) Media are organized to gain profit and/or power. 
These core concepts relate heavily to the previously and initially discussed problems with mass 
media (Kellner & Share, 2005). Increasing the awareness of these inherent problems, or these 
core concepts of critical media literacy, is vital to the future usage of media in society. Perhaps 
most importantly, Kellner and Share (2005) argue that media literacy would not only promote the 
avoidance of media fear manipulation, but also enhance individuals’ abilities to use media 
sources more effectively as tools of communication and positive social change. 
The idea of critical media literacy is great, but a problem exists in how to catalyze a 
realization for the necessity of such education. One potential solution would be to include critical 
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media literacy in education systems. But, Alvermann and Hagood (2000) argue that in the 
American education system, rational thought and the intellect are valued over mental struggle, 
particularly mental struggles that occur from inconsistencies in society which are commonly 
portrayed through the media. In addition, leisure activities (e.g. the consumption of the media) 
are generally considered outside the realm of academic pursuits, and thus it would be difficult to 
incorporate such discussions or teachings of critical media literacy in the educational system. 
However, such implementation is necessary, as it would increase an individual’s literacy abilities 
for in and out of academia based sources.  
With the constantly changing media, literacy abilities are being challenged. The meaning 
of literacy commonly known as the ability to read and write is no a longer sufficient definition. 
Critical media literacy is an increasingly important component of daily functioning with a variety 
of media outlets introduced and an increasing amount of information passing through such 
media. Alvermann and Hagood (2000) do address that media may change too quickly to fully 
incorporate critical media literacy into education system. But, some form of critical media 
literacy needs to begin earlier in American education, as it currently begins in college for most 
individuals. Alvermann and Hagood (2000) close with the suggestion that if such an 
implementation were to be successful, the lines between in-school and out-of-school literacies 
must be lost and concern for mental struggle to understand and address societal inconsistencies 
must occur within academic settings.  
In summation of this critical media literacy argument, while I support the inclusive of 
such education into American academic institutions, I think that the final burden is on the media 
consumer to begin or continue such education. Taking responsibility for one’s own media 
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literacy education, allows consumers to avoid emotional manipulation by the media and the 
adverse behavioral outcomes associated. Ultimately, while certain behaviors committed by 
media outlets, and politicians through the media, in the end, the institution of the media is not 
responsible for the actions of its consumers.  
Conclusions 
 Whether its running from a snake in the mountains of Arizona or the sense of unease 
experienced passing through Union Station in Washington, D.C. at night, fear manifests in a 
variety of ways in humans and other animals. The emotion of fear exists for the purpose of 
danger-detection. Fear responses are adaptations that were adopted due to the fact that they 
increase chances of survival. Fear systems operate daily using innate and learned fears to process 
and respond to stimuli. These fear systems used by humans and other animals are conscious and 
unconscious. Both serve adaptive functions, but can be misled.  
 This paper highlighted the benefits of both types of fear processing to human survival 
today. But, it also recognizes that when fear reactions are misled (or wrong), humans and social 
systems are especially impacted. The power and influence of the negative emotion of fear can 
produce cognitions and behaviors that are unwarranted, or even problematic for ourselves or 
others. One evolutionary fear that is commonly misinterpreted and acted upon is fear of the out-
group. While this fear still has some adaptive function, it is the source of many problematic 
behaviors today. Such behaviors include, racial prejudice, acting on negative stereotypes, 
avoidance of out-group members, and even increased violence against out-group members.  
This paper cautions against such behaviors and promotes learning about human fear 
processes in an effort to combat these harmful misled fear responses. Ultimately, humans have 
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the responsibility to first, recognize our experiences of fear and attend to them, but also ensure 
the source of fear is legitimate, and that our actions that follow are warranted.  
In habitually incorporating such practices into daily life, individuals will be better 
protected against unintentional bias, and intentional manipulation that occurs often times through 
the media. As stimuli perceived through all forms of media are not physically present, the 
experience of fear or anxiety from such stimuli is non-productive because no immediate behavior 
is required. In sum, through the media, fear is even further misled from even the evolutionary-
based tendencies toward wrong conclusions during experiences of fear. Crisis news, politically-
based news coverage, and entertainment media all, arguably, unintentionally provoke fear or 
anxiety in media consumers by the topics they cover and their presentations of such topics. In 
modern society, fear is intentionally manipulated by individuals and organizations that hope to 
achieve certain fear responses. For example, political campaigns often intentionally use fear 
tactics to induce fear responses in media consumers. 
To combat such misled and manipulated fear, the burden is on media consumers to 
initiate critical media literacy education to better understand the inherent flaws in media sources. 
Through such education, people can obtain the capability of opposing misled and manipulated 
fear and limiting unnecessary, or even harmful, reactions to it. At a basic level, merely increasing 
awareness of such tactics and phenomena is an effective way to oppose its effects.  
 Ultimately, fear is good. In its intended state, it helps humans and other animals respond 
to threatening stimuli and react in a way that best promotes survival. In other states, fear, in the 
form of anxiety, is potentially detrimental to proper human functioning. It occasionally facilitates 
inaction. But fear can also motivate problematic action as well—actions that are harmful to 
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others, specifically members of an out-group. Upon reflection, I do not have some exciting 
concluding revelation about how human beings can eliminate maladaptive fear responses. What I 
do have is the information that opposing evolutionary tendencies is hard, and recognizing 
implicit bias might be even harder. But, learning to better understand these aspect of the adaptive 
unconscious and human functioning, will better prepare individuals not only to contribute to a 
society freer of discrimination and prejudice, but also to oppose their own manipulation by 
external forces, such as the media.   
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Figures 
 
Figure 1. Violence Index trends from 1967 to 1976 as measured by Gerbner for different hours of 
programming and by the different television networks, ABC, CBS, and NBC. The uncertain 
direction of the trends supports a conclusion that violence portrayed in entertainment media is 
not on a decline. Overall, CBS shows the most promise toward a decrease in the amount of 
programming that incorporates violence. Adapted from “Television Violence: Measuring the 
Climate of Fear,” by George Gerbner, 1976, American Medical News, Impact Section. Copyright 
1976 by the American Medical Association.  
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Figure 2. Fox News coverage screenshot from an interview with Morten Storm on November 17, 
2015. In this interview, Storm announced a certain terror strike by ISIS was to occur within a 2-
week time frame. This is an example of breaking news that is not factually supported and 
unnecessarily invokes fear into viewers. Adapted from “Once Again, Media Terrorize the Public 
for the Terrorists,” by A. Johnson, 2015. Copyright 2019 by Fairness & Accuracy in Reporting.  
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Figure 3. Example of the Bush campaign strategy that induced fear using the convicted criminal, 
William Horton. The advertisement induces fear by the description of Horton’s crimes, and 
connects Dukakis with Horton in an effort to induce negative emotions toward him. Adapted from 
“How the Willie Horton ad played on racism and fear,” by E. Blakemore, 2018. Copyright 2019 
by A&E Television Networks.  
